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INTRODUCTION
Advanced technological processes have facilitated the commercial
exploitation of works of art, craft, and knowledge1 of traditional
societies on a scale that is unprecedented.2  One can find openly
displayed in many malls in the United States numerous art and other
objects imported from traditional communities stretching from
Africa to the Americas and Australia.3  In addition, there is evidence
of indigenous music and dance being sampled by record companies
and performance groups, which are presented to the public as
                                                 
1. Commercially relevant traditional knowledge includes:
[the] location of local mineral and wild plant resources, domesticated plants with
interesting genetic properties, musical instruments producing evocative sounds, new
ingredients for cosmetics, new foods and spices, art designs and their potential use on
all manner of salable products, mythic elements and stories, and sites for tour
organizers.
Tom Greaves, IPR:  A Current Survey, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES:  A SOURCEBOOK 3-4 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
2. See id. at 13 (warning that rapidly developing technology poses the most serious threat
to intellectual property protection because it increasingly allows slight alterations or parallel
materials to be used to emulate the original idea).
3. See, e.g., Babacar Ndoye, Protection of Expressions of Folklore in Senegal, 25 COPYRIGHT:
MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 374, 375 (1989) [hereinafter 25 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW] (decrying that there is more African art in cities like as New York than in
African cities); David Sassoon, The Antiquities of Nepal, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at
47, 48 (discussing the pervasive theft of antiquities from Nepal for sale or display in the United
States).
original compositions or choreography.4  Monopolistic tendencies are
also evident in the acts of individuals and companies who formally
register folkloric themes,5 sometimes incorporating them into
advertising and commercial propaganda, as a way of preventing
others from using them.6  Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies7
and even government agencies8 regularly finance expeditions into
remote traditional areas9 in the hopes of tapping into local
knowledge of the medicinal value of plants10 that could in turn be
                                                 
4. Babacar Ndoye, a former director of the Copyright Office of Senegal, cites as an
example the secret of an African folklore group’s European performance by a composer who
arranged and registered the recording as his original work.  The work was a phenomenal
success, but all profits went to the composer without any compensation to the community from
which the folklore originated.  See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 376 (asserting the necessity for
stringent protections of expressions of folklore in light of current technological capabilities).
5. It is not uncommon to find individuals in the United States who have registered the
names of common objects, such as the “kente” cloth produced in West Africa, as trademarks.
6. See Antonio Chaves, The Brazilian Folklore and Its Protection, 16 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY
REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 125, 126 (1980) [hereinafter 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW]
(noting that by the time Brazilian copyright efforts began, folklore was studied, compiled, and
published by “more advanced” mostly European countries).
7. Major corporations involved in collecting expeditions include Merck, Sharp, Dohme,
and Monsanto.  See Jack Kloppenburg, Jr., No Hunting!  Biodiversity, Indigenous Rights, and
Scientific Poaching, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 14, 15 (noting that companies’
“chemical prospecting” can yield high profits when those chemicals are manufactured into
prescriptions and other medicines); see also Steven R. King, The Source of Our Cures, CULTURAL
SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 19 (describing Shaman Pharmaceuticals’ compensation
approach to the use of plant-derived medicines originally discovered by indigenous people).
8. The National Cancer Institute in the United States (“NCI”) maintains extensive plant
collection programs in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar
and Tanzania.  See Gordon M. Cragg et al., Policies for International Collaboration and Compensation
in Drug Discovery and Development at the United States National Cancer Institute:  The NCI Letter of
Collection, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 83, 87 (noting that plant collection programs entail
contracts between NCI and local organizations for collection, taxonomy, packaging and
shipment of botanical samples to the United States).
9. Medicinal plant research has focused on tropical rain forests because a significant
portion of Western prescription drugs are known to have been made from substances found in
those areas.  See Cures from the Forest, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 53 (noting that
50% of Western prescription drugs were manufactured from substances originally discovered in
tropical rain forests).  The discovery of plant-derived cancer drugs such as vinblastine and
vincristine from Madagascar’s periwinkle led to the U.S. National Cancer Institute’s creation of a
systematic program of testing plants for anticancer activity.  See Cragg et al., supra note 8, at 85
(noting that between 1960 and 1982 approximately 35,000 plant samples were collected under
the auspices of NCI and the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
10. The scientific basis for the presence of medically useful compounds in plants is
undisputed:
Evolution has been selecting plants whose metabolism generates compounds with
adaptive value; for instance, a bitter-tasting plant is less likely to be eaten by
herbivorous animals (the same with a pepperish one, an allergenic one, a bad-smelling
one, and so on).  These compounds are, therefore, active on biological systems.  The
bioactivity of such compounds might eventually have therapeutic value; the chemical
compounds will be absorbed by the body and interact with its receptors as any Western
drug.  There is no magic or folklore; Western-trained pharmacologists have no
problem in accepting the fact that some plants that produce certain chemicals are,
indeed, medicines.
Elaine Elizabetsky, Folklore, Tradition, or Know-How?, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 9,
used to develop drugs for sale.11  In addition, research scientists
collaborate with indigenous farmers to obtain local crop varieties to
improve seeds under so-called biodiversity programs.12
Associated with these forms of folklore commercialization is a
serious concern that traditional societies may be short-changed or
even harmed during the process.13  In many cases where traditional
art or knowledge is exploited, the communities derive either no
economic benefits,14 or if they do gain something, such benefits often
pale in comparison to the huge profits made by the exploiters.15  In
addition, traditional communities are harmed by forms of
exploitation, which can lead to the permanent loss of irreplaceable
property to museums and art houses.16  These communities are also
harmed by uses that degrade cultural items to the extent the items
are displayed outside their traditional setting17 and for purposes
                                                 
9.  Elizabetsky argues that because the benefits derived from plant sources are inarguably
indigenous knowledge, such benefits should be legally protected.  See id. at 10.
11. Approximately three-quarters of the plant sources used for the manufacture of
prescription drugs come to the notice of researchers because of their uses in traditional
medicine.  See Kloppenburg, supra note 7, at 15 (noting that Western collection strategies pay
close attention to indigenous medical practice).
12. See generally Stephen B. Brush, A Non-Market Approach to Protecting Biological Resources, in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 131, 133 (asserting that this collection practice will only be
affected slightly by laws which protect intellectual property rights and offering an alternative
method of protection through emphasis on indigenous farmers’ rights).
13. See Michael F. Brown, Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 204-
06 (1998) (criticizing legal regimes designed to protect against cultural appropriation as
inappropriate and politically unviable methods which ignore the idea of free public access to
information).
14. Failure to compensate indigenous communities adequately may be due to the
deliberate refusal of the exploiters to pay, or where they are willing to pay, difficulties in
identifying the proper owners to whom payment is to be made.  See Janet McGowan & Iroka
Udeinya, Collecting Traditional Medicines in Nigeria:  A Proposal for IPR Compensation, in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 57, 59 (describing the difficulties in compensating indigenous
peoples for their traditional knowledge, due in part to the fact that multiple communities share
the same knowledge).  It is not uncommon for exploiters to refrain from making payments so
as not to offend local cultural sensitivities.  See Greaves, supra note 1, at 4 n.5 (“Various
traditional ethical systems resist financial transactions with nature’s gifts.”).
15. For example, after the discovery of the tumor fighting capabilities of Madagascar’s
periwinkle, the plant was patented and sold, netting the company approximately $100 million,
88% of which was profit to the company.  See A.B. Cunningham, Indigenous Knowledge and
Biodiversity:  Global Commons or Regional Heritage?, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 4, 6.
16. Permanent loss can occur when valuable pieces of folklore are expropriated from the
traditional communities and sent overseas.  See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 375 (decrying the
removal of objects which represent cultural heritage because “civilizations are mortal”) (citation
omitted).  It is hardly surprising that there is more African art in major Western cities than in
African cities.  See id.  While some of these items may have been sold or given away by traditional
elders, in many cases, it is likely that the items were forcibly removed, particularly during the
colonial era.  See id. (arguing that colonists recognized the “vitality” of African culture as
evidenced by their systematic dispersal of African art).
17. See Sassoon, supra note 3, at 49 (describing the degradation of religious objects, such as
a Nepalese torana which depicts a Hindu god and is intended for display above a temple
doorway, but instead hangs at the doorway of a New York City art gallery).
different from those for which they were originally created.18  For
instance, this occurs when religious artifacts are sold as mere
decorative art.19  There is further harm where commercial copies of
cultural works misrepresent communal values,20 are of inferior
quality,21 or are made from different materials.22
These considerations have fueled the push for effective legal
protection of folklore23 to give traditional communities24 and national
governments greater control25 over the use of folkloric works to
                                                 
18. Limitations on the use of the works of folklore to special occasions and rituals are not
likely to be respected where such works are removed from their original culture.  See id. at 49
(noting that some objects of indigenous culture are only displayed at certain times of the year,
or only on particular days, and therefore have special significance to that culture).  For
examples of the special uses for works of folklore, see infra text accompanying notes 66-115.
Thus, a sacred-secret object of an indigenous group could be used openly in the West.  See
Alan Jabbour, Folklore Protection and National Patrimony:  Developments and Dilemmas in the Legal
Protections of Folklore, 17 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1) 10, 11 (1983) (giving examples of the Western
publication of sacred dances whose particulars are intended to be known by only a select few).
Even where African dances are copied and performed abroad, there is denigration of African
culture to the extent that the “non-African actors cannot lend the gestures that communicative
[sic] warmth specific to Africa.”  See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 376 (arguing that copying by
foreigners renders moot African states’ efforts to promote African culture abroad).
As one writer laments:
[I]t is possible to encounter ‘groups and soloists who unscrupulously modernize works
of folklore by arranging them in a new manner, by giving folk songs added rhythm
and volume at the expense of their melodic character . . . .  Performances of folk
dances often take the form of ‘banal, impersonal shows devoid of the characteristics
peculiar to . . . folk dances . . . .  As for the garishly-colored costumes worn by the
dancers, they are a travesty of the originals.
E.P. Gavrilov, The Legal Protection of Works of Folklore, 20 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY REV. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG. 76, 79 (1984).
19. See Sassoon, supra note 3, at 47, 49 (noting with frustration that artifacts are not
displayed in galleries for their religious significance but rather as “peripheral luxuries of
[Western] culture”).
20. Cf. Susan Lobo, The Fabric of Life:  Repatriating the Sacred Coroma Textiles, CULTURAL
SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 40, 41 (“Removed from the context of the community, the
textile is the object of differing often conflicting ideologies that define its intrinsic nature.”).
21. See Sandra Lee Pinel & Michael J. Evans, Tribal Sovereignty and the Control of Knowledge, in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1 at 41, 47 (asserting that commercial copies are inferior in quality
because they use a less labor intensive production method and lower quality materials).
22. Mass-produced items sold as traditional craft raise authentication problems to the
extent they do not have the same attributes as the traditional items.  See id. at 47 (explaining
that mass production often requires the use of different material, and creates products of
inferior quality to traditionally-produced crafts).  Also, the large scale production of traditional
items has come to be viewed as “a cultural and psychological threat to the authentic
practitioners of traditional arts and to the traditional groups whose values those arts express.”
See Jabbour, supra note 18, at 11.
23. See Brown, supra note 13, at 193 (arguing that what legal protections exist are
ineffective and have the adverse effect of limiting the free flow of information “essential to
liberal democracy”).
24. Traditional communities may lose control over their works when consent of the elders
in the community is not sought prior to the exploitation of a work of folklore.  See Pinel &
Evans, supra note 21, at 44 (discussing Native American tribes’ assertion of tribal sovereignty to
control the use and dissemination of culturally based knowledge by and to outside researchers
as a means of protecting the intellectual property rights of the tribe).
25. The state as the repository of folklore loses control when cultural artifacts are mass-
enhance revenues.26  On a broader level, nationalist aspirations27 and
the need to preserve folklore from the onslaught of foreign cultures28
also play a role.  For other advocates, the case for protecting folklore
is based on a principle of direct reciprocity.29  These proponents
                                                 
produced abroad without permission, with adverse consequences for state tourism policies and
cultural promotion programs abroad.  See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 376 (asserting that the
unauthorized reproduction of African ballets abroad reduces the demand for performances by
authentic African cultural troupes).
26. See Gavrilov, supra note 18, at 79-80 (“[L]egal protection for folklore will make it
possible to derive earnings from the performances abroad of folklore works.”).
27. As a reaction to the colonial practice of denigrating African values while praising the
virtues of Western culture, African nationalists typically advocated African cultural unity in their
fight for independence.  See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 375 (noting that the first grass-roots
movements in the fight for independence focused on defining African culture; such efforts
included panafricanism).  Even after independence, the need remained to promote African
culture to stave off the continuing subtle denigration of the culture.  See Isaac G. Kalumbu,
Copyright and the Safeguarding of Folklore, RESOUND:  Q. ARCHIVES TRADITIONAL MUSIC, Jan-Apr.
1992 (proposing that the continued use of colonizers’ social customs by African leaders led to
later generations’ emulation of foreign practices rather than African traditions).  This was all
the more critical given the importance of folklore to national development, the promotion of
national unity, and the assertion of national cultural values.  See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 376
(asserting that folklore is a nation’s common heritage linking a nation’s various components
and providing a reference for national identity).  As one commentator has observed:
Folklore is essentially characterized as a work whose expressions merge within the
cultural identity and which must be rigorously protected both to ensure the continued
existence of that cultural identity and to prevent its being appropriated by ethnic
groups.  The basic aim of [legal protection] was to prevent any possible development
of ethnic chauvinism incompatible with our national unity.
Id. at 377.
Not surprisingly, African states have emerged with a sense of creative and artistic identity and
view folklore as a means of asserting their political and cultural identity.  See id. at 375 (asserting
that “folklore acts as a mirror” in which a cultural identity can be discerned).  African states
therefore consider the protection of folklore to be a priority.  See id. (focusing on Senegal’s
efforts at folklore protection).
28. For example, a World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Committee report
notes that “the threatened loss and disappearance of certain elements of folklore, particularly
in the face of modern communication technologies which facilitate the importation of foreign
cultures, [replace] local cultural traditions and promot[e] the hegemony of imported cultures.”
See REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON THE SAFEGUARDING OF
FOLKLORE [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE], reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL.
(No. 2) 39, 41 (1985) (emphasizing the need to protect and preserve folklore from the risks of
distortion or being forgotten).  This has prompted the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) to call for the implementation of appropriate
educational programs to preserve folklore and prevent it from “being uselessly sacrificed for
new elements which have nothing comparable to offer, and stimulating the techniques and
knowledge which each said culture is able to offer to the world.”  See Chaves, supra note 6, at 126
(quoting a recommendation by UNESCO presented at the International Folklore Congress on
Aug. 22, 1974).
29. Some see a need to redress an imbalance in the current state of affairs where
developing countries are being pressured to grant intellectual property protection to rights
important to the developed nations such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, and yet the
developed nations have failed to provide protection to folklore.  Cf.  Greaves, supra note 1, at 7
(noting that the United States has “aggressively pressured” other countries to enforce its
approach to protecting intellectual property); Daniela Soleri et al., Gifts from the Creator:
Intellectual Property Rights and Folk Crop Varieties, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 21, 23 (noting
Western industrial nations’ pressure on Third World countries to create and enforce laws which
protect intellectual property rights).  As explained in this Article, folklore consists of intangible
argue that folklore associated with developing nations should be
placed on the same footing as the intellectual property rights of the
developed nations,30 which are effectively “imposed” on the rest of the
global community under the new GATT arrangements.31
This Article examines the adequacy of the current legal framework
for protecting African folklore both inside and outside the African
continent.  Part I describes the nature of folklore and its significance
in traditional communities.  In addition, Part I explains how rights in
folklore are created and enforced according to a society of customary
law.  Part II examines the protection of folklore under national laws,
distinguishing between laws that contain specific references to
folklore and those that do not.  Part II also assesses the extent to
which folklore can be protected, if at all, under general intellectual
property laws, or under current African law.  Part III discusses the
relevance of two African regional arrangements to the protection of
folklore.  Part IV describes various international initiatives, including
attempts to provide model national laws on folklore.  As the United
States is a lucrative market for African folklore, Part V analyzes the
                                                 
rights closely resembling modern intellectual property.  See infra notes 81-89 (comparing
copyrights, trademarks, and patents to indigenous demarcations or other identifying
characteristics of folklore).  Thus, the argument can be made that protection of foreign
intellectual property rights in developing countries justifies reciprocal treatment of folklore.
30. See REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE BY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [hereinafter REPORT OF THE GROUP OF
EXPERTS], reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 21, 25 (1985) (noting the meeting
participants’ recommendations that treatment of folklore should be consistent with developing
countries’ treatment of foreign copyrights).
31. During the period leading up to the adoption of the new GATT arrangements, the
United States consistently pressured developing countries, especially those in Asia, to adopt and
enforce strong intellectual property regimes.  See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First
World Assets in the Third World:  Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 695-99 (1989) (reviewing U.S. and other industrialized nations’
concerns about technology transfer and developing countries’ refusal to recognize that the
GATT encompasses intellectual property).  For a discussion of the intellectual property issues as
they affect developing nations, see generally Mohammed Lawal Ahmadu & Izzat Ullah, The
International Patent System:  Some Legal Implications for Developing Countries, 8 LESOTHO L.J. 68, 68
(1992); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT:  A
View from the South 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 243, 245-63 (1989) (exploring the economics of
intellectual property rights protection from the point of view of less developed countries);
Oliver Morrissey & Yogesh Rai, The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures:
Implications for Developing Countries and their Relationship with Transnational Corporations, 31 J. DEV.
STUD. 702 (1995) (addressing lesser developed countries’ abilities to enhance and strengthen
their trading positions with transnational corporations); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in
International Trade:  Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747,
827-82 (1989) (identifying areas for potential compromise between private and public entities
regarding intellectual property); Gabriel E. Larrea Richerand, GATT, Intellectual Property Rights
and the Developing Countries, 25 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 3) 4 (1991) (discussing recent proposals
for improved protection of intellectual property); Ulrich Uchtenhagen, The GATT Negotiations
Concerning Copyright and Intellectual Property Protection, 21 INT’L. REV. INDUS. PROP. L. &
COPYRIGHT 765, 768-82 (1990) (providing an overview of why and how intellectual property
issues should be addressed in GATT negotiations).
protection of folklore under U.S. laws and explores some current
issues in the quest for greater recognition of intellectual property
rights in the cultural property of indigenous peoples.
This Article concludes that it is inherently difficult to protect
folklore under modern intellectual property laws which tend to be
prompted by concerns irrelevant to folklore.  Accordingly, this
Article, after reviewing laws and policies complementary to folklore
protection, proposes sui generis arrangements for folklore in Part VI.
Taking into account the disparate treatment of folklore in the laws of
African countries on the one hand, and those of the developed
nations on the other, this Article recommends a regional solution
instead of an international one.32  Specifically, it envisages the
creation of a new regional agency that would improve the existing
framework of protection by providing uniformity and consistency in
the dissemination of information about protected works, the
articulation of African claims to folklore, and the institution of
infringement actions over the use of folklore.33  This agency would
also be responsible for processing requests and distributing
compensation in connection with the use of folklore.34
I. FOLKLORE UNDER TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS
A. Nature of Folklore
Descriptions of the amorphous term “folklore”35 tend to emphasize
its diverse nature,36 consisting of, for example, the “traditional
customs, tales, sayings, or art forms preserved among a people.”37  In
                                                 
32. See infra Part VI.C.
33. See infra Part VI.C.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 547-56 (asserting that compensation schemes should
be broadened to include more innovative arrangements which are the responsibility of
contracting states).
35. For numerous definitions of the term “folklore” and what folklore includes, see
Definitions of Folklore, FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, MYTHOLOGY
AND LEGEND 255-64 (Maria Leach ed., 1959) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE] (providing
21 different definitions of the term “folklore”).
36. Regarding the diversity of folklore, one writer notes:
The great bulk and central core of folklore consists not so much in folk songs and
stories (although these are more obvious in their appeal as colorful and characteristic)
as in the customs and beliefs attending the ‘periods of emotional stress in the life of an
individual in relation to the group-birth, graduation, coming of age, marriage,
burial’ . . . .  Another considerable and important phase of folklore is made up of the
mass delusions and hallucinations of myths . . . and the apocrypha of hero-worship,
with its legends . . . .”
See B.A. Botkin, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 256-57
(discussing oral cultures and “handed-down” folklore as opposed to folklore maintained
through print).
37. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 479 (1984).
this sense, the term applies not only to ideas, or words, but also to
physical objects.38  Its oral nature,39 group features,40 and mode of
transmission through generations of people41 are other equally
important identifying characteristics.  To avoid a pejorative
connotation to practices common to marginal groups or lower strata
of society,42 the term “folk life”43 is sometimes preferred.
                                                 
38. Archer Taylor explains:
The folklore of physical objects includes the shapes and uses of tools, costumes, and
the forms of villages and houses.  The folklore of gestures and games occupies a
position intermediate between the folklore of physical objects and the folklore of
ideas.  Typical ideas transmitted as folklore are manifested in the customs associated
with birth, marriage, and death, with the lesser events of life, with remedies for
illnesses and wounds, with agriculture, the trades, and the professions, and with
religious life . . . .  Verbal folklore includes . . . tales of various kinds (marchen, jests,
legends, cumulative tales, exempla, fables, etiological tales), ballads, lyric folk song,
children’s songs, charms, proverbs and riddles.
Archer Taylor, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 263
(categorizing different types of folklore according to the means by which they are
communicated).
39. According to William Bascom, “the term folklore has come to mean myths, legends,
folk tales, proverbs, riddles, verse, and a variety of other forms of artistic expression whose
medium is the spoken word.”  William R. Bascom, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF
FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 256 (defining folklore in part as a “verbal art”).
40. For example, Theodor Gastor notes:
Folklore is that part of a people’s culture which is preserved, consciously or
unconsciously, in beliefs and practices, customs and observances of general currency;
in myths, legends, and tales of common acceptance; and in arts and crafts which
express the temper and genius of a group rather than of an individual.  Because it is a
repository of popular traditions and an integral element of the popular “climate,”
folklore serves as a constant source and frame of reference for more formal literature
and art; but it is distinct therefrom in that it is essentially of the people, by the people,
and for the people.
Theodor H. Gastor, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 258.
41. According to B.A. Botkin, “what distinguishes folklore from the rest of culture is the
preponderance of the handed-down over the learned element and the prepotency that the
popular imagination derives from and gives to custom and tradition.”  Botkin, supra note 36, at
256 (describing the process of passing down folklore as “creative remembrance” in that
folktellers remember as much as they forget or corrupt); see also Marie Niedzielska, The
Intellectual Property Aspects of Folklore Protection, 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at
339, 340 (stating that folklore is “passed by word of mouth, from memory or visually, from
generation to generation within a specific social group which is at once its user and carrier”).
42. Consider for instance, the statement that “[t]he materials of folklore are for the most
part the materials of social anthropology that have been collected from the barbarous and
‘uncivilized’ regions of the world, as well as from the rural and illiterate peoples of the
‘civilized’ countries.”  Aurelio M. Espinoza, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE,
supra note 35, at 257.  Similarly, another writer refers to folklore as:
The entire body of ancient popular beliefs, customs, and traditions, which have
survived among the less educated elements of civilized societies today.  It thus includes
fairy tales, myths, and legends, superstitions, festival rites, traditional games, folk
songs, popular sayings, arts, crafts, folk dance and the like.
John L. Mish, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 261.  Yet
another author refers to it as “the accumulated knowledge of a homogenous unsophisticated
people, tied together not only by common physical bonds, but also by emotional ones which
color their every expression, giving it unity and individual distinction.”  MacEdward Leach,
Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 261 (concluding that
folklore is re-created from its original individual source but becomes a group product through
Legal definitions underscore the importance of communal rights
to folklore.  For instance, Ghanaian legislation defines folklore as “all
literary, artistic and scientific work belonging to the cultural heritage
of Ghana which were created, preserved and developed by ethnic
communities of Ghana or by unidentified Ghanaian authors, and any
such works designated under this Law to be works of Ghanaian
folklore.”44
Nigerian law similarly defines folklore as:
a group-oriented and tradition-based creation of groups or
individuals reflecting the expectation of the community as an
adequate expression of its cultural and social identity, its
standards and values as transmitted orally, by imitation or by
other means.45
Identical definitions can be found in the laws of the Republic of
Congo,46 Burundi,47 Mali,48 Cameroon,49 Central African Republic50
                                                 
repetition).
43. The concept of folk life is much wider than folklore.  See George Herzog, Definitions of
Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at 259 (contrasting “folk life” with
“folklore”, which usually denotes only the countryside rather than urban areas).  As George
Herzog explains:
‘folk life’, more familiar in Europe and Latin America, covers the entire culture of a
‘folk’ group, usually a rural group whose mode of life is rather different from that of
its urban counterpart.  Such a wide expansion of meaning, stemming from a special
‘folk’ concept, has not been applied in the study of ‘primitive’ or preliterate societies.
Id. at 259.
44. Copyright Law (Ghana) § 53 (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY
REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 423, 435 (1985) [hereinafter 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW].
45. Copyright Decree (Nigeria) § 28(5) (Dec. 19, 1988), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT:
MONTHLY REV., supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 1, 8.
46. Under the laws of Congo, folklore is defined as “all literary and artistic productions
created on the national territory by authors presumed to be Congolese nationals or by
Congolese ethnic communities, passed from generation to generation and constituting one of
the basic elements of the national traditional cultural heritage.”  Law on Copyright and
Neighboring Rights (Congo) art. 15 (July 7, 1982), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY REV.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 201, 201 (1983) [hereinafter 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW].
47. Under the laws of Burundi, folklore is defined as “all literary, artistic and scientific
works created on the national territory by authors presumed to be nationals of Burundi, passed
from generation to generation and constituting one of the basic elements of the traditional
cultural heritage.”  Decree-Law Regulating the Rights of Authors and Intellectual Property
(Burundi) art. 4 (May 4, 1978), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at
120, 120-21.
48. Under the laws of Mali, folklore is defined as “any work composed on the basis of
elements borrowed from the national heritage of the Republic of Mali.”  Ordinance
Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 8 (July 1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 180, 182.
49. Under the laws of Cameroon, folklore is defined as “all literary, artistic and scientific
works produced by various communities and which, passed from one generation to another.”
Law No. 82-18 to Regulate Copyright (Cameroon) § 4(viii) (Nov. 26, 1982), reprinted in 19
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 360, 360-61.
50. Folklore is defined under the laws of the Central African Republic as “all literary and
artistic productions created by the national communities, passed on from generation to
and Senegal.51
Examples of folklore provided in the statutes include poetry,
riddles, songs, instrumental music, dances, and plays, productions of
art in drawings, paintings, carvings, sculptures, pottery, terra cotta,
mosaic, woodwork, metalware, jewelry, handicrafts, costumes, and
indigenous textiles.52  However, while the statutory illustrations
appear to exclude plant varieties grown by farmers, and plant extracts
developed by local medicine men, those items certainly qualify as
works of folklore to the extent that these techniques embody
scientific techniques53 passed down through generations in the
community.  The knowledge they embody is priceless and, once lost,
cannot be recovered.54  Widespread abuses in the exploitation of such
types of traditional knowledge55 certainly justify their inclusion in any
                                                 
generation and constituting one of the basic elements of the traditional cultural heritage.”
Ordinance No. 85-002 on Copyright (Central African Republic) art. 9 (Jan. 5, 1985), reprinted in
21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 158, 160.
51. Senegalese law defines folklore as “all literary and artistic works created by authors
presumed to be of Senegalese nationality, passed from generation to generation and
constituting one of the basic elements of the Senegalese traditional cultural heritage.”  Law on
the Protection of Copyright (Senegal) art. 9 (Dec. 4, 1973), reprinted in 10 COPYRIGHT:
MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 211, 212-13 (1974) [hereinafter 10 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW].
52. See, e.g., Copyright Decree (Nigeria) § 28(5) (Dec. 19, 1988), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, pages 8-9 (listing the ways in which
folklore is created).
53. The skills and procedures employed in the use of plants for traditional medicinal
purposes have been described as follows:
Traditional remedies, although based on natural products, are not found in “nature”
as such; they are products of human knowledge.  To transform a plant into a
medicine, one has to know the correct species, its location, the proper time of
collection (some plants are poisonous in certain seasons), the part to be used, how to
prepare it (fresh, dried, cut in small pieces, smashed), the solvent to be used (cold,
warm, or boiling water; alcohol, addition of salt, etc.), the way to prepare it (time and
conditions to be left on the solvent), and finally, posology (route of administration,
dosage).  Needless to say, curers have to diagnose and select the right medicine for the
right patients.
Elizabetsky, supra note 10, at 10-11 (questioning why we easily give credit to pharmacists or
physicians for their know-how and only refer to indigenous knowledge as "tradition,” “folklore,”
or just “knowledge”?).
54. See id. (stating that once this knowledge is lost, trying to recover it would be “like
searching for a needle in a haystack”).
55. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (noting how pharmaceutical companies
and government agencies often exploit the knowledge of local farmers in hopes of obtaining
knowledge of the medicinal value of indigenous plants).  To check against these abuses,
traditional farmers are demanding greater safeguards of their rights to:
(a) grow folk varieties and market folk variety seeds and food products, (b) be
compensated when folk varieties, folk variety genes, folk variety food products and
names are used or marketed by others, and (c) have a say in the manipulation and
other uses of folk varieties by outsiders, which may violate the cultural and religious
values with which folk varieties are often deeply imbued.
Soleri et al., supra note 29, at 24 (discussing the concern indigenous farmers have of protecting
their intellectual property rights).
protective legal regime.56
To complete the survey, it is important to note briefly the
significance of folklore to life in traditional societies.  Because of
their frequent references to morality and integrity, folksongs and
tales are used to build African character.57  Apart from its
entertainment value, music serves as a means of recording history by
preserving information about important past events.58  Music also
plays vital roles in rituals and festivities:59  as a palliative in healing,60 as
part of war preparation,61 and as a means for criticizing or checking
governmental abuses.62  Dance and drama are also linked to rituals
and religious festivities, while designs on African fabrics and art may
depict religious, social or cultural concepts.63
B. Protection Under Customary Law
Because folklore encompasses non-statutory practices of different
communities, rights in folklore may fall under the protections of the
customary law.64  Generally, such rights are recognized under social
                                                 
56. As Daniela Soleri and David Cleveland explain:
To those supporting farmers’ intellectual property rights in their folk varieties, the
effort and knowledge of indigenous farmers involved in creating and maintaining folk
varieties implies the need for recognition on an equal footing with that of plant
breeders and molecular biologists.  They see the communal effort in developing folk
varieties as an integrated part of making a living over generations to be as legitimate as
the individual efforts of scientists in formal, segregated work settings in the laboratory
or field plot.
Soleri et al., supra note 29, at 24.
57. Folktales developed in part from the “need to impress on men the moral truth that
wickedness and cruelty would in the long run meet with their due reward.”  JOHN ROSCOE, THE
BAGANDA:  AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR NATIVE CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS 460 (1965) (discussing the
origin and use of folklore in Uganda).
58. See BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING:  GATT, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 38 (1997).
59. As John Roscoe noted:
Among the musical instruments of the Baganda, drums must be given the first place.
The drum was indeed put to a multitude of uses, quite apart from music; it was the
instrument which announced both joy and sorrow, it was used to let people know of
the happy event of the birth of children, and it announced the mourning for the
dead.  It gave the alarm for war, and announced the return of the triumphant warriors
who had conquered in war.  It had its place in the most solemn and in the most joyous
ceremonies of the nation.
See ROSCOE, supra note 57, at 25.
60. Music plays this role by preparing the mind for occult healing acts.  See SODIPO, supra
note 58, at 38.
61. See ROSCOE, supra note 57, at 25.
62. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 38 (discussing music as a tool for social commentary).
63. See Betty Nah-Akuyea Mould-Iddrisu, Industrial Designs:  The Ghanaian Experience,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr.-May 1991, at 28, 29-30 (explaining that the Ashanti’s early form
of intellectual property rights arose because of the cultural significance of African cloths; each
and every design had a name which connoted either a religious, social or cultural event).
64. Customary law constitutes a major source of law in Africa.  See, e.g., A.E.W. PARK, THE
SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW 65 (1963) (stating that in Nigeria, most activities are conducted in
criteria depending upon the degree of the kinship, age, sex, title or
role of individuals in the society, and are enforced either by sanctions
based on common interests or a system of magical or religious
beliefs.65  For a clear understanding of the nature of traditional rights
in folklore, it is necessary to examine more closely the nature and
significance of the social structure in tribal societies.
1. Social groups and rights in folklore
The social organization of traditional societies is based on a strong
pattern of kinship groups with lineage as their basic constituent.66
The lineage forms the foundation of a wide social group called the
clan.67  A system of interclan linkages in turn results in a tribe made
up of people belonging to different lineages but speaking the same
language with the same traditions.68
Within each group is a leader, selected on the basis of seniority,69
who is accountable to the leader of the next higher group.70  Thus,
the leader of a nuclear family, consisting of two parents and their
children, would be accountable to the leader of the lineage, who in
turn is accountable to the leader of the clan, who is accountable to
the leader of the tribe, who is usually the chief.71  The leader controls
farmland and other property of the group, arbitrates disputes, and
imposes punishment to control the behavior of group members.72  In
this regard, the powers of chiefs and lineage elders can be quite
extensive.73  In addition, they exercise added moral and ritual
                                                 
accordance with customary law).  Customary law is generally defined to include the non-
codified practices of the different ethnic communities.  See, e.g., GHANA CONST. art. 11(3) (1993
Republican Constitution of Ghana) (defining customary law as “the rules of law which by
custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana”).  These practices are recognized in
judicial proceedings, and where applicable, given as much weight as the written law.  See MAX
GLUCKMAN, IDEAS AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 22-33 (1969) (discussing the
tension between the new court personnel from outside the community and traditional
personnel selected from among the community who are familiar with the court and its informal
customs and the emerging codification of customary law).
65. See generally SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43-47 (describing the use of religion and magic in
protecting works and property rights).
66. See MEYER FORTES, DYNAMICS OF CLANSHIP AMONG THE TALLENSI 30-38 (1945).
67. See id. at 224.
68. See MEYER FORTES, THE WEB OF KINSHIP AMONG THE TALLENSI 5 (1967); see also
ELIZABETH COLSON & MAX GLUCKMAN, SEVEN TRIBES OF BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA 72 (1968)
(discussing the relationships and web of kinship among the Lozi tribe of Northwestern
Rhodesia).
69. See FORTES, supra note 66, at 224 (“[S]eniority commands deference at all times.”).
70. See id. at 225 (stating that there is a hierarchy of the segments corresponding to the
hierarchy of lineage heads).
71. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43 (describing the system of social stratification).
72. See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 170.
73. For a description of the powers of the lineage head and chief among the Bemba tribe,
see id. at 32, 169-70 (describing some of the chief’s powers, which include acting as head of the
authority based on a perceived mystical association with the tribes’
ancestors.74
In interacting with each other, it is normal for individuals to
associate on the basis of age, sex, role or status in the society.  Thus,
children of a certain age frequently play or herd cattle together,75
guilds of craftsmen exist in certain industries,76 and exclusive male
and female associations are common.  Group relations are normative,
and give rise to a series of well-defined rights and obligations,
belonging and owing to members of the group.77  Kinship rights and
obligations are specific when the individual is interacting with
members of his lineage,78 but become more general as the degree of
kinship widens.79  Only members of the specific group are authorized
to carry out its functions and non-members are prohibited from
carrying on activities reserved for members.80
These norms are relevant to the recognition of folklore rights,
which closely resemble modern intellectual property rights.  Rights
sounding in copyright may be found in some traditional music, folk
songs, tales, dances, paintings, sculptures, drawings, and designs on
                                                 
tribe’s rough equivalent to a supreme court and his role as commander of warrior bands).  For
a discussion on the authority of the chief of the Ashanti and his obligations to tribal elders, see
KOFI ABREFA BUSIA, THE POSITION OF THE CHIEF IN THE MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE
ASHANTI 13-16 (1968); Lloyd Fallers, The Predicament of the Modern African Chief:  An Instance from
Uganda 57 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 290 (1955) (explaining the diverse roles of the modern
African chief).
74. See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 169 (noting that the chief’s authority is
sanctioned by the belief that the chief descended from the original tribe).
75. When a group of boys are out herding cattle, the oldest of them is usually put in
charge.  See FORTES, supra note 66, at 224.  As to the types of age groups that may be formed, see
COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 269-78 (discussing how the Nyak Yusa tribe lives in
villages based on their age group such that people of the same age live together their entire
lives).
76. Such associations are common in the soap-making, blacksmithery, ceramics, carving,
and textiles industries.  For instance, it has been noted that the Lozi develop friendships both
among themselves and with smiths, hunters, and other professionals from other tribes and that
they “tend to extend the scope and duration of transitory associations to make them multiplex
and permanent relationships . . . .”  See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 84.
77. Writing about the significance of lineage membership to a kinsman, Myers Fortes notes
that:
It is a fact that marks him off from a great many people who come into his range of
contact.  It determines, for example, whom he may or may not marry, what social roles
he may or may not exercise, who will support him in his troubles, where he will make
his farms, and especially which named ancestors ritually accessible at certain definite,
material shrines govern his life.
FORTES, supra note 66, at 135.
78. See id. at 134-35.
79. See id. at 137 (“Through clan membership one belongs to a community, defined not by
specific rights and duties based on the spiritual jurisdiction of one’s own ancestors, but
principally by common values and common ritual interests.”).
80. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43 (discussing how only certain members of the
community could produce certain works and how it was taboo for non-members to take part in
those activities).
crafts.81  Marks on agricultural implements,82 clothes,83 and on works
of art84 may serve identification functions akin to the role played by
trademarks.  Additionally, sophisticated technology rights evident in
mining activity,85 canoe building,86 construction of musical
instruments87 and cloth-weaving devices,88 and the practice of herbal
medicine89 are reminiscent of patents.
Folklore rights are vested in particular segments of the community
                                                 
81. Designs are commonly made on pots, clothes, leather, wood, and calabashes.  See id. at
38 (describing how designs on these crafts were common and how these activities would
probably have been protected under current copyright laws).
82. See id. at 39.
83. Signs woven into certain clothes denote their origin or the identity of the producers.
Thus, it is possible to distinguish Kano cloth by its deep blue/indigo characteristics.  Also,
depending on the designs and materials used, cloths could have political, ritual or social
significance.  Special cloths are used to decorate shrines, to bury the dead, for coronations of
chiefs, or to signify status in society.  See id. at 40.
84. Inscriptions on works of art in brass, bronze, gold, clay or wood can provide clues to
the origins of the work.  For example, as noted by Bankole Sodipo, “works of art from the Nok
region [of Nigeria] often had two holes made in the head, while those from Ife had two or
more heads at the top of the work.”  Id. at 40.  It is also common for some products or paintings
to bear
the insignia of cults, designating that to which the owners or wearers belonged:  for
example, the left fist with a thumb concealed over the right fist for the Ogboni, the 16
birds in a circle around a central bird for the Osanyin, the double-headed axe and
gourd rattle of Sango [the god of thunder].
Id.  Pottery and handicraft could also be identified by various characteristics.  The type of
pottery at a deceased’s grave often depicts the class of society to which he belonged.  See id. at
40.
85. For descriptions of traditional mining processes, see ROSCOE, supra note 57, at 378-83
(describing the history and work of traditional mining processes); JOHN ROSCOE, THE
NORTHERN BANTU 74-76 (1966) (commenting on iron working and smithing).  In Northern
Zimbabwe, iron-smelting is carried on mainly by the Lunda and is rarely found among the
Bembe.  See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 167 (noting that the Bembe are warriors
who do not create skilled handicrafts to trade or sell).  The Kpelle people in Liberia are
renowned for their advanced metallurgical technology.  See Gordon C. Thomasson, Liberia’s
Seeds of Knowledge, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1991, at 23, 25 (describing Kpelle
metallurgical technology as “sophisticated, quite distinctive, and clearly not derived from
neighbors, captives, or slaves”).
86. Among the Baganda, canoe building involves unique methods and is mainly carried
out by members of the Lung-fish clan who also are the general workers of wood.  See ROSCOE,
supra note 57, at 383, 406.
87. Some traditional musical instruments are so novel they could be patented.  See id. at 25-
37.  It is possible to find differences in the construction of the various musical instruments.  For
example, the strings of the Basoga harp are horizontal whereas those of the Baganda are
vertical.  See id. at 34.
88. Looms used in the weaving of cloth can vary in shape and size from one community to
the other.  See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 41.
89. Herbal medicine is practiced widely in African communities.  Among the Baganda, for
example, “each clan had its medicine-men, who through their skill and cunning, gained an
insight into character, and also into certain arts which they use to the best advantage.”  ROSCOE,
supra note 57, at 277-78 (discussing the role of medicine men).
Like the medicine-men, there are rainmakers who claim to possess mystical powers or secret
knowledge.  See ROSCOE, supra note 85, at 181-82 (believing that they have magical powers,
rainmakers have induced others to have faith in their powers).
and are exercised under carefully circumscribed conditions.90  For
instance, with regard to song, the recitation of oriki, a praise-singing
poetry among the Yoruba in Nigeria, was preserved exclusively for
certain families.91  Among the Lozi in Zimbabwe, each traditional
leader has his own praise songs containing both historical lore and
proverbial wisdom that are recited on important occasions by a select
group of bandsmen.92
Precise rules also govern who can make or play certain musical
instruments, and at what time and for what reasons they are played.93
Thus, the great national drums of the Lozi which are beaten only for
war, or in national emergencies, are under the watchful eye of a
special council of elders.94  Each Baganda king in Uganda has a select
group of drummers who play special drums to ensure the
permanency of his office.95  Among the Bahima of Uganda, only
women keep harps, which they use at home.96  Among the Baganda,
fifes are owned and played mainly by herd boys.97  In Nigeria, certain
musical instruments are dedicated to particular cults.98
Similar rules apply to crafts.  Among the Tonga of Zimbabwe, crafts
are subject to a sexual division of labor with wood and metals
assigned to men and the making of pots, baskets, and mats to
women.99  Within this broad division, there is a further specialization,
because not all men and women are skilled in the art assigned to
their sex.100  Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman write that “only
those who have been instructed by an ancestral spirit are considered
                                                 
90. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43 (discussing how some practices are restricted to certain
sections of the community).
91. See id. at 43 & n.202 (citing Revd. B. Kingslake, Musical Memories of Nigeria, 1 J. INT’L
LIBR. AFR. MUSIC 20 (1957)) (discussing how certain works could only be performed by certain
segments of the community).
92. See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 39 (discussing the praise songs as an
example of the esteem the Lozi exhibit towards their leaders).
93. See ROSCOE, supra note 85, at 189 (noting that for the Bagesu the drum is used for
public dances, while the harp accompanies songs in the house, but is not used publicly).
Similarly, the Bagesu have very strict gender roles for the dances.  See id.
94. See id. at 47 (explaining the cultural significance between the national drums and the
King’s personal drums).
95. See ROSCOE, supra note 57, at 25-33 (detailing the creation of the drums and their
cultural significance).
96. See ROSCOE, supra note 85, at 140.
97. See ROSCOE, supra note 57, at 35-37 (outlining the many uses of the fife in Baganda
culture).
98. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 46 n.216 (noting that “the drum, bata, was dedicated to
the worship of Sango”).
99. See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 103-05.  In contrast to the Tonga, basketry
among the Ngoni is a man’s craft and is usually conducted at the end of the rainy season.  See id.
at 220.
100. See id. at 103-04 (discussing the need for specialization).
to have the right to work at a particular craft . . . .”101  In many cases,
only a few specialists are needed to supply the community’s demand
for wooden dishes, stools, drums, axes or spear blades.102  Usually two
or three women are authorized to make pots or baskets and may
trade their surplus articles in a casual fashion with their neighbors.103
Similarly, among the Banyoro of Uganda, baskets are made by
women belonging to the agricultural clans, who supply the rest of the
community, including the pastoral peoples, with any baskets they
require.104  Among the Baganda, the Heart Clan makes ornate
basketry only in Budu.105
The making of Banyoro pottery, which is known for its excellent
quality, is reserved to a distinct class separate from the ordinary
peasants.106  In Nigeria, the Dakakari people have given exclusive
rights to women to make grave sculpture.107  With respect to cloth-
making, the chief of the Ashanti in Ghana is the trustee of interests in
all designs in fabrics, which he would either reserve for himself or
allow prominent royals or dignitaries to copy for their use.108
Observance of these norms with regard to folklore, as is the case
for all traditional norms, is secured through a system of sanctions that
may vary according to the degree of kinship.109  On the lineage level,
the norms are absolutely binding, with the sanction usually being the
common ritual dependence of members of the lineage on their
ancestors,110 who, it is believed, will, without fail, punish violators of
the norms.111  When norms take on such mystical connotations they
are seen as taboos112 and can be particularly effective in controlling
                                                 
101. Id. at 103.
102. See id. at 104 (noting that this work is done casually and in their spare time, but that
they make enough to fill the need of the neighborhood).
103. See id. (“[T]hey do not produce deliberately for a market.  A potter, indeed is
prevented from filling contracts by the belief that a promised pot will break during the firing.”).
104. See ROSCOE, supra note 85, at 80 (discussing the fact that these baskets were extensively
used by agricultural peoples and not pastoral clans).
105. See ROSCOE, supra note 57, at 410-12 (explaining that the fancy baskets made from a
cane-like material were quite fragile and intended only for display).
106. See ROSCOE, supra note 85, at 78-79 (explaining that for these individuals pottery is
their chief employment).
107. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43 (noting that all women could make domestic pottery,
but only women of particular families were allowed to make grave sculpture).
108. See Mould-Iddrisu, supra note 63, at 29 (describing the apparent “copyright” the
Ashanti chief holds over new fabric designs).
109. See FORTES, supra note 66, at 135.
110. See id. (“The lineage as a social entity is founded on moral and ritual imperatives.”).
111. See FORTES, supra note 68, at 235 (noting that when the parents die, their spirits
emerge as the paramount sanction of moral conduct for their children by inflicting punishment
for wrongdoing).
112. A taboo has been defined as:
a system, engendered by superstitious belief, by which certain objects and persons are
set aside as sacred or accursed.  It may also be described as a political, social or
human behavior.113  Observance of the norms by wider social groups,
however, is motivated not necessarily by the same ideas of spiritual
jurisdiction, but rather by the common interests and ritual values that
may be found among clans in the tribe.114  The sanctions, often
determined by the leaders of the constituent groups, could range
from censure, to fines, to ostracism, or even expulsion from the
group.115
2. Effectiveness of customary law protection
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that customary law
protection of folklore relies on norms and sanctions which seem to
make sense only to members of the groups.116  Within the groups,
there is pressure to recognize and respect the rights and privileges
associated with folklore in the common interests of members of the
community.  Inherent in this system, however, is a defect that may
limit the usefulness of customary law in tackling the problems of
unauthorized uses.117  Since many of the individuals engaged in the
                                                 
religious prohibition webbed in superstition.  It is believed that failure to observe it
brings the anger and curses of the gods against the offender or even against the whole
community.  This is the sanction of taboo.
SODIPO, supra note 58, at 42 (quoting MASON BEGHO, LAW AND CULTURE IN THE NIGERIAN AND
ROMAN WORLD 99 (1971)).
113. See id. (“In some places, it instills a greater fear in the minds of men than the fear of
going to prison when a criminal offence is committed.”).
114. See FORTES, supra note 66, at 137 (indicating that clanship bonds are derived from a
much broader line of ancestry than lineage bonds).
115. The system of punishment has been explained as follows:
The breach of a tradition could be punished by the head of the family, or clan, or
by members of an age group.  Erring members could be disciplined by the head of the
larger family, who might order a fine of items like local gin, goats, etc., or a sacrifice.
Pressure would be brought to bear on any offender who failed to pay his fine or who
repeated the offence.  His wife would plead with him to avoid the long-term
repercussions (bad luck) which would ensue for his immediate family.  The offender’s
wife would be coerced by members of her original larger family to press her husband
to conform.  Other members of the larger family might also coerce an offender into
paying his fines, to avoid repercussions on their family.
Further disobedience could lead to the family being ostracized by the larger
family, or by the entire community.  This was often the worst kind of punishment.
The community would not buy from him or sell to him or members of his immediate
family.  If he was still obdurate (depending on the offence), he could either be
banished from the community or he would leave of his own accord because he would
not be able to bear the shame.  Such exit usually must be for a distant community,
neighboring communities would probably know that the newcomer was an offender
from another community.  He would then be seen either as bringing ill luck, or as a
danger to the new community since he might be disobedient and cause an upset in
the new community.
SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43-44.
116. See id. at 42 (“Indeed, what made traditional society unique was the reliance on
traditional norms for the ordering of behavior.”).
117. See supra notes 3-22 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous unauthorized
uses and commercial exploitation of these works).
unauthorized use of folklore are foreigners,118 they may not have the
incentive to respect the norms in the interest of the general
community.  Where those individuals using folklore are outside of
the relevant community, fear of sanctions as a factor in securing
compliance is simply non-existent due to the elders’ lack of
jurisdiction, and the lack of common communal, and ritual
interest.119
Even with respect to indigenous collaborators residing in the
community, who should be bound by the norms, socioeconomic
factors seem to have eroded the significance of norms otherwise
applicable to them.  Initially, the simple nature and small size of
traditional societies made it possible to accommodate a system of
specialists providing for other members without any commercial
motives largely out of necessity,120 and as a gesture of generosity
emanating from abundant resources.121  The advent of the modern
state, however, has dispensed with the need for mutual cooperation
to protect the community.122  In some areas, notions of collective
ownership have been contaminated by concepts of private ownership
and of production for profit as resources became scarce and the
competition for them keen.123  As a result, considerations of
communal interests seem to have given way to individualistic notions
with their attendant commercialism.124  This modern individualism
explains why customary law norms may not be quite as significant in
traditional societies as they used to be and why some indigenous
people are now willing partners in the unauthorized transfer of the
community’s folkloric interests.
                                                 
118. This term is used broadly to refer not only to non-citizens of the country, but also to
citizens who are not members of the particular ethnic group to which the folkloric rights are
relevant.
119. See Soleri et al., supra note 29, at 22 (noting that U.S. guidelines for collecting folk
varieties call only for respect of the local farmer and do not mention requesting permission or
any form of recognition compensation).
120. See GAIM KIBREAB, REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM:  A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 68 (1983) (explaining that people in traditional societies
found it necessary to unite to protect life and property, and to overcome problems caused by
natural forces over which they had little control because of their poorly developed productive
forces).
121. See id. (discussing the fact that the absence of private ownership of the basic means of
production and the concomitant absence of any profit motives in the primarily low-subsistence
level economies that existed made it possible for visitors to be accommodated materially).
122. See id.  The modern African state, with its developed system of defense in the form of
large standing armies and efficient police units, provides adequate security for the community,
making mutual cooperation for defense unnecessary.  See id.
123. See Samuel K.B. Asante, Interests in Land in the Customary Law of Ghana:  A New Appraisal,
74 YALE L.J. 848, 857 (1965) (discussing evolving concepts of land ownership in response to
social and economic changes).
124. See id.
Because of these limitations of customary law, it is imperative to
identify alternative methods of protecting folklore.  The next section
considers attempts to protect folklore under general intellectual
property laws of African countries and under regional and
international law.
II. PROTECTION UNDER NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
A. Provisions That Do Not Reference Folklore
1. Scope of protection
African countries recognize and protect intellectual property rights
in copyrights, patents, and trademarks.  In Ghana,125 copyright
protection extends to literary works, artistic works, musical works,
sound recordings, broadcasts, cinematographic works, choreographic
works, derivative works, and program-carrying signals.126  To be
eligible for copyright, the work must be original, in writing, or
otherwise reduced to material form, and created by a citizen or
resident of Ghana.127  The work must also have been first published in
Ghana, or if first published outside Ghana, published in Ghana
within thirty days of its publication outside Ghana.128
Protection is granted, in the case of individuals, during the life of
the author and extends fifty years after his death.129  For corporate
bodies, the applicable period is fifty years from the date on which the
work was made public.130  An author has the exclusive right to
reproduce, translate, or adapt the work;131 has the sole right to claim
authorship of the work and can demand that his name or pseudonym
                                                 
125. Ghanaian law is discussed here because it is representative of laws in other parts of
Africa.
126. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 2 (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 423-24.
127. See id. § 2(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424 (listing
factors which make a work eligible for copyright).
128. See id. § 2(2)(c), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424
(explaining that the work should be of a type that Ghana is obligated under an international
treaty to grant protection).  The artistic quality of the work, the purpose of the author in
creating it, or the manner or form of its expression are irrelevant to the question of eligibility.
See id., reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
129. See id. § 10(1), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 425.  For
works involving joint authorship, the copyright is protected during the life of the last surviving
author and 50 years after his death.  See id. § 10(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW,
supra note 44, at 425.
130. See id. § 11, reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 425 (stating
that the term of protection shall be 50 years when owned by a public corporation or other
corporate body).
131. See id. § 6(1), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
be mentioned in any use of his work.132  In addition, he can alter the
work133 and object to any distortion of the work, which harms his
reputation or discredits the work.134  Private use,135 quotations in other
works,136 and use in pedagogy,137 however, are permitted uses of the
copyrighted work not requiring the consent of the author.
It is an infringement of copyright to reproduce,138 sell, or exhibit in
public for commercial purposes, any work without the copyright
owner’s authorization.139  It also constitutes infringement to use the
work in a manner that adversely affects the reputation of the
author.140  Civil remedies for copyright infringement include
injunctive relief,141 damages142 and actions to inspect or remove the
copyright infringing materials.143  Criminal penalties such as a jail
term,144 payment of compensation and forfeiture of all infringing
materials145 may also be imposed.146
                                                 
132. See id. § 6(2)(a), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
133. See id. § 6(2)(c), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
134. See id. § 6(2)(b), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
135. See id. § 18(1)(a), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 426
(allowing an individual to use the copyrighted materials).
136. For this to apply, the work from which the quotations are taken must have been made
public and the source and the name of the author of quotations must be identified in the other
work.  See id. § 18(1)(b), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 426.  The
quotation must be compatible with fair practice and should not exceed what is justified for the
purpose of the work in which the quotation is used.  See id. § 18(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 426.
137. Copyrighted work may be used for illustrative purposes in publications, broadcasts or
sound or visual recordings for teaching in educational institutions, or for professional training
or public education.  See id. § 18(1)(c), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note
44, at 426.  However, such use must be compatible with fair practice and the source of the work
used and the name of the author must be identified in the relevant publication, broadcast, or
recording.  See id. § 18(3), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 426.
138. The statute is quite broad and covers acts which “reproduce, duplicate, extract, imitate,
or import into Ghana otherwise than for . . . private use or permit or cause to be reproduced,
duplicated, extracted, imitated, or imported into Ghana otherwise than for . . . private use.”  Id.
§ 43(1)(a), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
139. See id. § 43(1), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
140. See id. § 43(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
141. See id. § 44(1)(a), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
142. See id. § 44(1)(b), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
The civil remedies are not mutually exclusive; the grant of an injunction cannot bar a claim for
damages.  See id. § 44(3), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
143. See id. § 44(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 433.
144. A conviction carries a fine or a maximum jail term of two years.  See id. § 46(2), reprinted
in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 434.
145. See id. § 48(a)-(b), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 434
(stating additional measures to compensate victims of copyright violations).
146. If the defendant is a corporation, criminal responsibility attaches to every director or
secretary of the corporation.  If it is a partnership, then all partners will be held accountable.
No individual officer or partner would be liable, however, if the offense he is charged with is
committed by another person without his consent and the officer or partner exercised all due
diligence under the circumstances to prevent the commission of the act.  See id. § 47, reprinted in
21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 434.
In regard to patent protection, an invention is patentable in
Nigeria147 if it is new, results from inventive activity,148 and is capable of
industrial application.149  The general right to a patent is vested in the
inventor, who is the first person that may file a patent application.150
Benefits conferred under a patent include the right to preclude other
persons from using the patent, or applying the process in, making,
importing, selling or using the product, or stocking it for the purpose
of sale or use.151  Patents are generally valid for 20 years from the
application filing date.152
A patent infringement action153 may be brought by the patentee or
design owner,154 or even by a licensee when the patentee or design
owner refuses to heed the written request of the licensee to file suit.155
Remedies for infringement include damages, injunction or
accounts.156
In addition to copyright and patent, Nigerian legislation protects
registered trademarks.  Registration of a trademark in relation to
goods entitles the registrant to exclusive rights of use over the
trademark157 and to initiate infringement actions.158  Infringement
                                                 
147. Nigerian law is discussed here because it is representative of laws in other parts of
Africa.
148. The Nigerian Patents and Designs Act provides that:  “An invention results from
inventive activity if it does not obviously follow from the state of the art, either as to the method,
the application, the combination of methods, or the product, which it concerns, or as to the
industrial result it produces.”  Patents and Designs Decree (Nigeria) § 1(2)(b) (1970), reprinted
in 12 INDUS. PROP.:  MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 147, 148 (1973) [hereinafter 12
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY].
149. See id. § 1(1), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 147.
Improvements on patented inventions are also patentable if they meet the same criteria.  See id.
§ 1(1)(b), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 147-48.
150. See id. § 2(1), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 148 (discussing
the order of priority for patent rights).
151. See id. § 6(1), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 149 (discussing
the rights of patentees conferred by the legislation).
152. See id. § 7(1), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 150.
153. It constitutes patent infringement for a person, without license from the patentee or
design owner, to do any act that is precluded under the Act.  See id. § 25(1), reprinted in 12
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 154 (defining infringement of patent rights).
154. See id. § 25(2), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 154.
155. See id. § 25(4), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 154-55.  In
infringement proceedings, where a process patent has been granted for the manufacture of a
new product and the same product is manufactured by a person other than the patentee, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, the product will be presumed to have been manufactured by
that process.  See id. § 25(3), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 154
(outlining the burden of proof in patent infringement actions).
156. See id. § 25(2), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 154.
157. See Trade Marks Act (Nigeria), CAP 436, § 5 (1967) (on file with the author).
158. A trademark is infringed if a person other than the owner or registered user uses an
identical mark or one so nearly identical as to result in deception or confusion.  See id. § 5(2).
(describing acts that constitute trademark infringement).  There is also trademark infringement
if the mark is used upon goods or for advertising purposes in such a way that the mark imports
a reference to one who has the actual trademark rights, either as an owner or a registered user.
actions may not be initiated for unregistered trademarks.159
Registration is for a seven-year renewable term.160
To qualify for registration, a mark must be distinctive.161  It may
consist of, for example, the name of a company, individual, or firm,
or invented word or words.162  The mark must also distinguish the
goods of the owner of the trademark from the goods of others.163
However, names that deceive or refer to scandalous matters,164 names
of commonly used chemical substances,165 and marks that are
identical to trademarks already registered to another person, or that
so closely resemble such trademarks as to be likely to deceive or cause
confusion, are prohibited from registration.166
2. Problems with protecting folklore under general intellectual property laws
Extending these statutory rights and remedies to folklore would
significantly improve the protection available under customary law.  It
would mean that rights to folkloric works could be enforced within
national boundaries instead of under the limited jurisdictional
confines of the local community.  The national court system would
also complement the authority of elders and other group leaders and
strengthen prohibitions and conventions regarding the use of
folklore.  Traditional communities would have greater control over
the use of their works and be able to demand compensation.
Infringing parties, including those who alter or desecrate works of
folklore, would be subject to criminal and civil sanctions167 instead of
the mystical opprobrium that may be unenforceable under a strict
                                                 
See id. § 5(2)(b) (describing improper uses of trademarks).
159. See id. § 3 (stating that proceedings cannot be filed, nor damages recovered, for the
infringement of unregistered trademarks).
160. See id. § 23.
161. The Act defines “distinctive” as
adapted, in relation to the goods in respect of which a trademark is registered or
proposed to be registered, to distinguish goods with which the proprietor of the
trademark is or may be connected in the course of trade from goods in the case of
which no such connection subsists, either generally or, where the trademark is
registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use within
the extent of the registration.
Id. § 9(2).
162. See id. § 9(1) (listing the “essential particulars” required for registration of a
trademark).
163. See id. § 10(1).
164. See id. § 11.
165. See id. § 12(1).
166. See id. § 13(1).
167. See Copyright Law (Ghana) §§ 44, 46 (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 433-34 (providing for injunctions, the recovery of
damages, and criminal fines).
customary law regime.168
It has been suggested that aspects of folklore that could be
regulated under copyright laws include the traditional paintings,
sculptures, designs and drawings as artistic works;169 dramas, dances,
and folktales as literary works;170 and folk songs as musical works.171
This may be justified on account of the similarities between folklore
and other works protected under copyright law.  For example, in
both copyright and folklore the author uses creativity in the works’
formation and utilizes similar means in exploiting them.172
Building on this, advocates further suggest that to avoid creating
duplicative agencies to administer both types of works, it would
simplify matters to charge existing author societies with the
responsibility for protecting folklore.173
                                                 
168. See FORTES, supra note 68, at 235-36.
169. The term “artistic work” in Ghana refers to “paintings, drawings, etchings, lithographs,
woodcuts, engravings or prints.”  Copyright Law (Ghana) § 53(a), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 435.  It also includes “maps, plans or diagrams; sculpture;
works of architecture in the form of buildings or models.”  See id. § 53(c)-(e), reprinted in 21
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 435.  Finally, folklore includes “works of applied
art, whether handicraft or produced on an industrial scale.”  See id. § 53(f), reprinted in 21
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 435.
170. In Ghana, the term “literary work” includes stories, poetical works, and plays.  See id. §
53, reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 435.
171. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 39-41.  The term “musical works” in Ghana refers to, “any
musical work irrespective of its musical quality and words composed for musical
accompaniment.”  Copyright Law (Ghana) § 53, reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW,
supra note 44, at 435.
172. As one writer notes:
Like any subject of copyright, (scientific, literary and artistic works), folklore is the
result of a creative process.  Folklore takes the same form as any subject of copyright,
that is, the form of a work.  Strictly speaking, folk songs can be regarded as a variation
on the kind of song that is protected by copyright, while folk art productions can be
assimilated to decorative art, etc.  So with regard to their form of expression, works of
folklore are comparable to the works protected by copyright.  With respect to their
content, of course, folk productions do differ from authors’ works, but the distinction
has no bearing on the provision of legal protection.  The public use of works of
folklore and works protected by copyright takes place according to identical processes:
publication of folk tales and folk songs, public performance or television broadcasting
of folk dances, reproduction and sale of folk art productions, etc.  It is impossible to
visualize any use of works of folklore that does not have a counterpart in the field of
copyright.  Finally, works of folklore have to be protected against alteration, as in the
case of all works in the copyright field.
Gavrilov, supra note 18, at 78.
173. Gavrilov further notes:
There are a number of uses of works protected by copyright where the authors assert
their rights through the agency of authors’ societies.  This generally happens in the
case of public performance or radio or television broadcasting of songs or other short
works, the production of copies of sound recordings, the reproduction of works of art
in magazines and books and also some other uses of works for mass distribution.  The
authors’ societies collect the royalties payable from the users, and handle their
distribution to the authors; they also issue the authorizations for the use of works and
ensure the observance of moral rights, namely the right of authorship of the work and
the right to respect for the work.  Inasmuch as works of folklore are used by the same
Advocates for the expansion of intellectual property law to folklore
also believe that clothing designs, sophisticated marks on agricultural
implements, and carvings could be protected as trademarks while the
technology processes in cloth-weaving, metal-working, constructing
musical instruments, and the practice of herbal medicine could be
patented.174  In general, given the fate of similar endeavors in other
areas,175 these advocates consider it to be far more effective in the
long run to protect folklore under existing intellectual property laws,
than attempt to fashion new laws specifically for that purpose.176
As a practical matter, however, it may be difficult to protect these
rights under the general provisions of statutory law.  There are
inherent difficulties in fitting folklore into certain accepted notions
of intellectual property relating to ownership, originality, duration,
fixation, inventiveness and uniqueness.177  First, one would be
confronted immediately with a fundamental problem of
inappropriate categorization.  As Farhana Yamin and Darrell Posey
have observed:
It is difficult to classify indigenous knowledge innovations
and practices into categories of intellectual property
developed for use by commercial firms in an industrial and
secular context because the lines between indigenous
                                                 
means as works protected by copyright, their protection would require the existence of
bodies comparable to authors’ societies.  Instead of setting up “parallel” bodies, it
would be preferable to assign the responsibility for protecting works of folklore to
existing authors’ societies.
Id. at 78-79.
174. See SODIPO, supra note 58, at 43-47.
175. See Kalumbu, supra note 27 (noting that African governments have failed to develop
adequate policies to protect certain aspects of the cultural heritage).
176. Gavrilov explains as follows:
[A]t the international level, it is far easier to incorporate the legal protection of works
of folklore in the existing copyright conventions than it is to set up separate machinery
for the purpose.  Experience has shown that if certain results of creative activity whose
protection is difficult to accommodate in the available legal categories that already
enjoy protection, and therefore constitute a category apart, the introduction of their
protection at the international level is postponed for a long time or even never
achieved.  For instance, type faces were made distinct from industrial designs, with the
result that the Vienna Agreement for the Protection of Type Faces and their
International Deposit, which was concluded in 1973, is still not in force.  Another
example is that of the legal protection of software and computer programs.  On the
basis of the assumption that that subject matter should not be protected either by
copyright or by the law of patents (inventions), it was recommended that special
legislation should be drafted.  That legislation has already been drawn up on the basis
of elements drawn from copyright and from patent law, but a national law has yet to
be enacted specifically for the protection of software and computer programs.  In the
meantime the trend towards rejecting the idea of protection on the basis of copyright
and patent has continued to grow.
Gavrilov, supra note 18, at 79.
177. See Greaves, supra note 1, at 8-10 (discussing the problems of applying intellectual
property laws to the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples).
religious, cultural, business, intellectual and physical
property are not as distinct or mutually exclusive.  For
example, indigenous ‘sacred sites’ are frequently both
ecological reserves developed through human knowledge of
management and conservation and cultural centres that have
both physical as well as spiritual significance.  Concepts such
as business reputation and goodwill are also difficult to
apply.178
Moreover, the statutes assume that protection would be accorded
in most cases to the creator of protected works.  Intellectual property
laws reflect a bias in favor of individuals who are said to own rights in
the protected works.179  Because different concepts of ownership
rights apply in traditional schemes,180 folklore may not fall within the
purview of intellectual property law.181
In traditional societies, ownership refers to the rights of all
members of the community in subject-matter originally acquired by
ancestors which cannot be transferred unilaterally by any member of
the group, including the head leader.182  Writing about the communal
rights in land among the Tallensi of Northern Ghana, Meyer Fortes
observes that:
To say that land is owned by a lineage is equivalent to saying
that it is generally acquired by right of inheritance.  All males
of the lineage have the right to inherit lineage land, but at
any given time control over it is vested in the head of the
lineage, by right of seniority . . . .  He is bound to provide
fairly for the wants of those who share the labor of farming
with him.  Tallensi formulate this obligation in terms of
reciprocity within the productive unit, which they regard as a
matter of natural justice and moral duty . . . .  In accordance
                                                 
178. Farhana Yamin & Darrell Addison Posey, Indigenous Peoples, Biotechnology and Intellectual
Property Rights, 2 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L. ENVTL. L. 141, 142 (1993).
179. For example, Nigerian law provides that:
the right to a patent in respect of an invention is vested in the statutory inventor, that
is to say, the person, who, whether or not he is the true inventor, is the first to file, or
validly to claim a foreign priority for, a patent application in respect of the invention.
Patents and Designs Decree (Nigeria) § 2(1) (1970), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra
note 148, at 147, 148.
180. For a discussion of concepts of ownership in traditional societies, see Colvin Golvan,
Aboriginal Art and the Protection of Indigenous Cultural Rights, 7 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 227, 227
(1992) (discussing the anonymous creation of aboriginal artwork and the non-celebratory
nature of aboriginal artists); Anthony Seeger, Ethnomusicology and Music Law, 36 J. SOC’Y FOR
ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 345 (1992).
181. See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples:  Is Intellectual Property
the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (“Application of intellectual property laws, whose
underlying logic is to facilitate dissemination, is fundamentally inappropriate to prevent sacred
indigenous images from circulation and re-use.”).
182. See FORTES, supra note 66, at 178 (explaining common ownership of land by a lineage).
with this obligation a lineage head always consults his
dependents about the disposal of land, crops, or other
patrimonial property . . . .  To pledge it is a slur on them; to
sell it a sacrilege.  ‘It will kill (de kura kum)’— the offended
ancestors will cause deaths in the family of the seller . . . .183
Traditional societies support collective efforts and discourage
private efforts motivated by selfish considerations without regard to
communal interests.184  This idea that rights belong to on going
communities in traditional societies conflicts with the objective of
modern intellectual property law, which encourages private initiative
and provides rewards for individual rights.185  Consequently, modern
intellectual property provisions would be difficult to apply generally
in the case of communal ownership of legal rights, which so far
appear to have received scant attention in the property rules
enunciated under common and civil law.186
In addition to these general problems of categorization and
ownership,187 customary law rights may not even meet the specified
                                                 
183. Id.
184. See ROSCOE, supra note 85, at 231-32 (describing the inheritance system of the
Northern Bantu as based on fairness, where property goes to those most qualified to manage it
for the benefit of the community).
185. The justification for using intellectual property to support a system of rewards is as
follows:
A society thrives on progress.  Creative people provide the innovations that generate
progress.  To foster creativity, creators must foresee the prospect of benefiting
materially from their works.  Within Eighteenth Century capitalism this meant (and
still means) vesting creators with the rights of monopoly ownership in exchange for
placing the information in the public domain.  That monopoly remains in force for
only a finite period of time, however, so as not to unduly impede further progress and
price competition that comes when the innovation is available for all to use.  Patents
and copyrights, then, reward the innovator sufficiently to encourage creativity, but
then lapse so that further development by others, and economic competitiveness, can
supplant the temporary monopoly.
Greaves, supra note 1, at 8-9.
186. See Golvan, supra note 180, at 229-30 (arguing that more legal protection of Aboriginal
art and culture is needed).
187. The issues may be summed up as follows:
Indigenous groups have made it quite clear that the concept of “property,” and
especially individual property, is alien and antithetical to their collective values.  They
have repeatedly explained how many (but not all) songs, drawings, ceremonies, plants,
animals, and designs are inalienable and, therefore, can never be property.  And they
point out that individuals who use or display them are the “holders,” “trustees,” or
“stewards” for communities, lineages, ancestors, gender groups, future generations, or
even spirits.  Furthermore, indigenous peoples have been explicit in showing that
“intellectual” aspects of culture cannot be separated from “physical,” “natural,” or
“spiritual” elements because culture is an extension of nature (and vice versa).  Thus
“intellectual property” is doubly inappropriate in that it excludes plants, animals, and
knowledge about them (seeds, soils, minerals, and management practices, etc.)—all of
which are inextricable elements of a society’s “intellect.”
Darrell Addison Posey, Michael F. Brown’s Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 211 (1998) (commentary) (refuting Brown’s claim that indigenous
groups’ concerns with patents and copyrights are “romatici[zed]”).
statutory criteria.  Generally, copyright law requires protected works
to be original.  As provided in the Ghanaian legislation:  a “work is
not eligible for copyright unless . . . it is original in character.”188  For
purposes of that law, a work is original “if it is the product of the
independent efforts of the author.”189
In this sense, the traditional rights susceptible to copyright
protection would be excluded since their originality would be
difficult to establish.  For example, there may be a problem
identifying an individual who could claim authorship given the
passage of folklore through generations of people in the
community.190  It is obvious that while an individual may have indeed
created a particular work of folklore, it would eventually have been
acquired and used by the society at large and gradually, with the
passage of time, have lost its individualistic traits.191  For example, “all
aspects of folklore, probably originally the product of individuals, are
taken by the folk and put through a process of re-creation, which
through constant variations and repetition become a group
product.”192  For this reason, it would prove a daunting task to identify
the first creator of a work of folklore.  Even if an author could be
located for a variant of folklore, it may still be difficult to establish the
“independent efforts” of such an author sufficient to justify copyright
protection as the work would invariably have been built on and be
substantially similar to existing works of folklore.193
Another requirement to grant copyright protection to a work is
that it must have been “written down, recorded or otherwise reduced
to material form.”194  Certain rights in folklore such as songs and
dance are unlikely to satisfy this fixation requirement inasmuch as
they are largely verbal and have not been written down or recorded.195
                                                 
188. Copyright Law (Ghana) § 2(2)(a) (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 424.
189. Id. § 2(4), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
190. See Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo:  Putting Ideas
into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J. 293, 307-08 (1995) (explaining that Aboriginal folklore derives
from complex relationships between generations of people and their land).
191. See Mamie Harmon, Definitions of Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 35, at
258-59 (stating that folklore is defined by the ways in which it is transmitted, such that the work
of an individual can become folklore as it is acquired as the symbol of a group and passed
through generations).
192. Leach, supra note 42, at 261.
193. See Farley, supra note 181, at 22 (discussing the difficulty in copyrighting indigenous
artwork because of its similarity to previous works and finding the alternative of “thin” copyright
unsatisfactory because only the changes to an indigenous piece are protected).
194. Copyright Law (Ghana) § 2(2)(b) (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 424.
195. See Botkin, supra note 36, at 256 (discussing “purely oral culture[s]” in which folklore is
passed through generations without ever being fixed or frozen in a particular form).
As for patents, inventions are patentable in Ghana if they are “new,
involve[] . . . an inventive step and . . . [are] industrially applicable.”196
Ghanaian patent law explains that “an invention is new if it is not
anticipated by prior art.”197  The statute then describes “prior art” as
including “[e]verything made available to the public anywhere in the
world by means of written disclosure (including drawings and other
illustrations) or by oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other non-
written means . . . .”198  The criterion of inventiveness is met if the
invention “would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art
to which the invention pertains . . . .”199  The invention is industrially
applicable “if, according to its nature, it can be made or used in the
technological sense, in any kind of industry including agriculture,
fishery and services.”200
Although some traditional methods are capable of a technological
use201 and therefore are likely to meet statutory criteria pertaining to
industrial application, they may be excluded on grounds that they are
already available to the public and do not constitute inventive steps as
they have been passed down through generations.202  As folklore is
never invented, but simply evolves, it may be excluded from patent
law.203
Trademarks in Nigeria are entitled to registration if they are
unique and are capable of distinguishing between similar goods that
are produced by different proprietors.204  Protecting traditional marks
under Nigerian statutory law, however, would be difficult because the
use of these marks in commerce has not developed to any level of
                                                 
196. Patent Law (Ghana), P.N.D.C.L. 332, § 2 (1992) (on file with the author).
197. Id. § 3(1).
198. Id. § 3(2).
199. Id. § 4(1).
200. Id. § 5.
201. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the potential of patent law to
protect the processes of weaving, metal-working, constructing musical instruments, and using
herbs for medicinal purposes).
202. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing folklore as that which is passed
down through generations of folk and evolves with every step).
203. Mamie Harmon notes:
Folklore . . . may crop up in any subject, any group or individual, any time, any place.
It might be thought of as comprising that information, those skills, concepts, products,
etc., which one acquires almost inevitably by virtue of the circumstances to which he is
born.  It is not so much deliberately sought (like learning) as absorbed.  It is not
deliberately invented; rather it develops.  It is present in the environment, is accepted,
used, transformed, transmitted, or forgotten, without arbitrary impetus from
individual minds.
Harmon, supra note 191, at 258.
204. See Trade Marks Act (Nigeria), CAP 436, § 10(1) (1967) (on file with the author) (“In
order for a trade mark [sic] to be registrable . . . it must be capable . . . of distinguishing goods
with which the proprietor of the trademark is or may be connected in the course of trade from
goods . . . [with] no such connection.”).
sophistication, partly due to the nature of the market.205  Therefore,
local producers probably would not be concerned with inserting
identifying marks to distinguish their goods from those made by
others; and as a result any marks on their goods would not be
sufficiently unique to qualify for protection under Nigerian
trademark law.
Moreover, modern intellectual property rights are not of unlimited
duration.  For example, in Nigeria patents are generally granted for
twenty years,206 in Ghana copyrights last for the life of an author plus
fifty years,207 and in most African countries trademarks are recognized
for various renewable terms.208  In contrast, a work of folklore could
exist for centuries before it is abandoned or “forgotten,”209 and thus,
it is impossible to limit its protection to the finite regimes of
intellectual property.  Even if folkloric works did not have such
longevity, it would be difficult to establish a framework for
determining an appropriate protection period because the slowly-
evolving nature of folklore makes it impossible to determine precisely
when a work of folklore was first created.  Furthermore, as explained
above, folklore’s communal origin precludes the identification of any
one individual by whose life a protection term could be
determined.210
Finally, many important folkloric rights may even be excluded from
protection under existing intellectual property laws.  Ghanaian law,
for example, excludes from patentability all “plant or animal varieties
or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals, other than microbiological processes and die products of
such processes.”211  The Ghanaian legislation also excludes from
patent law protection all “methods of treatment of the human or
animal body by surgery or therapy, as well as diagnostic methods.”212
                                                 
205. In traditional societies, goods were purchased directly from producers, who sold them
through their family or through middlemen or at particular markets.  See SODIPO, supra note 58,
at 41.
206. See Patents and Designs Act (Nigeria) § 7(1) (1970), reprinted in 12 INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 147, 150 (“[A] patent shall expire at the end of the twentieth year
from the date of the filing of the . . . application.”).
207. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 10(1) (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 425.
208. In Nigeria, the relevant term is seven years.  See Trade Marks Act (Nigeria), CAP 436,
§ 23(1) (on file with the author).
209. See Harmon, supra note 191, at 258 (describing how folklore that is transmitted orally
can, over time, fade from the collective memory of a group or society).
210. See Puri, supra note 190, at 307-08 (noting that folklore evolves over many generations);
supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of identifying the creator of
a work of folklore).
211. Patent Law (Ghana), P.N.D.C.L. 332, § 1(3)(b) (1992) (on file with the author).
212. Id. § 1(3)(d) (noting that the products used in surgery or other diagnostic methods
If these provisions were construed narrowly, they would effectively
exclude from protection any plant varieties developed by traditional
communities, as well as aspects of their herbal medical practice.213
B. Laws Referring to Folklore
1. Scope of protection
To improve the protection of folklore recognized under customary
law, some African copyright legislation specifically references
folklore.  Ghanaian copyright law, for example, provides that the
copyrights of authors of folklore vest in the government as if the
government were the creator of the works.214  Thus, one cannot use
Ghanaian folklore for purposes other than those statutorily
authorized215 without applying to the Secretary, and paying a fee.216  It
is a criminal offense for a person, without the permission of the
Secretary, “to import . . ., sell, offer . . . for sale or distribute in
Ghana . . . copies of . . . works made outside Ghana [of] works of
Ghanaian folklore or translations, adaptations, or arrangements of
Ghanaian folklore.”217  A conviction may result in a substantial fine, a
two-year jail term or both.218  The Secretary also is authorized to adopt
regulations regarding the designation of particular practices as
Ghanaian folklore.219
Nigerian copyright law protects expressions of folklore “against
reproduction, communication to the public by performance,
broadcasting, [or] distribution by cable.”220  In addition, it protects
adaptations, translations and other transformations of such folklore,
when such expressions are made either for commercial purposes, or
outside their traditional or customary context.221  The right to
                                                 
may be protected under patent law while the methods themselves may not be protected).
213. See supra notes 53-56 (categorizing certain tribal plant varieties and herbal medicines as
folklore).
214. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 5(2) (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 424.
215. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (finding that permission of the author is
not required to quote the work, use it privately, or use it in pedagogy).
216. The Secretary is the Ghanaian Government’s Minister for Information.  See Copyright
Law (Ghana) § 53, reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 434.  The fees
that the Secretary collects are deposited into a fund to be used to promote institutions that
work for the benefit of authors, performers, and translators.  See id. § 5(4), reprinted in 21
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 424.
217. Id. § 46(1)(a)-(b), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 434.
218. See id. § 46(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 434.
219. See id. § 52(2)(a)(i), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 435.
220. Copyright Decree (Nigeria) § 28(1) (Dec. 19, 1988), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 1, 8.
221. See id., reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01,
authorize any of the aforementioned acts vests in the Nigerian
Copyright Council.222
Nigerian folklore may be used without authorization for private or
educational purposes,223 as well as for illustrative purposes in other
original works.224  Whenever folklore is referred to, whether in
printed publications or in communications to the public, the law
requires identification of the source of the folklore by reference to
the community or place from where the folklore is derived.225  Uses of
folklore other than as permitted and without the consent of the
Nigerian Copyright Council will subject the user to liability to the
Council in damages, injunctions, or any other remedies that the
court deems appropriate.226
Congolese copyright law protects folklore without a time
limitation.227  In Congo, a society known as the “Body of Authors” is
responsible for collecting royalties, representing the interests of
authors, and overseeing the use of folklore,228 which is regarded as
part of the national heritage.229  Prior to any public performance,
reproduction, or adaptation of folklore for commercial purposes,
permission must be sought from the society.230  The society charges
users of folklore a fee to support cultural and social objectives that
                                                 
page 8.
222. See id. § 28(4), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria,
text 1-01, page 8.  The Nigerian Copyright Council is a corporate body “responsible for all
matters affecting copyright in Nigeria,” including advising the government on international
copyright treaties and conventions, informing the public about copyright issues and
maintaining records of authors and their works.  See id. § 30, reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 9.
223. See id. § 28(2)(a)-(b), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at
Nigeria, text 1-01, page 8.  If the folklore is used publicly, then it must be “accompanied by an
acknowledgement of the title of the work and its source.”  See id. § 28(2)(a), reprinted in 25
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 8.
224. When folklore is used for such illustrative purposes, however, the utilization must be
compatible with fair practice.  See id. § 28(2)(d), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW,
supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 8.  The statute also provides, without explanation, that
expressions of folklore are not protected against “incidental uses.”  See id. § 28(2)(e), reprinted in
25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 8.
225. See id. § 28(3), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria,
text 1-01, page 8.
226. See id. § 29, reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-
01, page 9.
227. See Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) art. 16 (July 7, 1982), reprinted
in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 201, 202.
228. See id. arts. 68-69, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 244
(stating that the “Body of Authors” is answerable to the Ministry of Culture and acts as the
intermediary between the author and users of literary and artistic works with respect to the
grant of authorizations and the collection of royalties).
229. See id. art. 15, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 202 (noting
that folklore is one of the basic elements of Congo’s cultural heritage).
230. See id. art. 18, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 202
(requiring prior authorization for uses that generate profit).
benefit Congolese authors.231  Penalties can be assessed against
persons who fail to obtain the required authorization.232  Although
public agencies are exempted from the obligation to obtain prior
authorization to use folklore for non-profit activities, they
nevertheless must notify the collecting society before using the
material.233
Congolese copyright law prohibits the import or distribution of
copies of works of national folklore made abroad without the
permission of the Body of Authors.234  Under a provision that applies
generally to copyright, fines may be imposed for the unlawful export,
import or reproduction in Congo of works published in Congo or
abroad.235  The collecting society is authorized to take legal action to
prevent the improper exploitation of national folklore and has the
power to institute infringement proceedings, to obtain seizure orders,
or issue injunctions.236
In Mali, folklore is also considered part of the country’s heritage.237
With the exception of public entities, all persons seeking to use
folklore for profit must obtain prior authorization from the Minister
of Arts and Culture who may impose a fee for such use.238  In
addition, the law prohibits the total or partial assignment of
copyrights or exclusive licenses in “works derived from folklore”239
without the approval of the Minister.240  Significantly, the law also
places in the public domain and charges a user fee for all “works
whose authors are unknown, including the songs, legends, dances,
and other manifestations of the common cultural heritage.”241  This
                                                 
231. See id. arts. 17-18, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 202.
232. See id. art. 78, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 245
(describing a fine as “twice the due fees”).
233. See id. art. 19, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 203.
234. See id. art. 20, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 203.
235. See id. art. 77, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 245.
236. See id. arts. 70-72, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 244.
Under Congolese law, the Court of First Instance can order a seizure of any unauthorized
reproductions of protected works as well as revenues therefrom.  See id. art. 71, reprinted in 19
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 244.  Examples of injunctive relief include
suspending the manufacture, reproduction, or performance of works of folklore.  See id.,
reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 244.
237. Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 8 (July 1, 1977),
reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 180, 182.
238. See id. art. 8, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 182.
239. The term “work derived from folklore” means any work composed on the basis of
elements borrowed from the national heritage of the Republic of Mali.  See id., reprinted in 16
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 182.
240. See id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 182.
241. Id. art. 9, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 182.  The statute
authorizes the Ministers of Arts and Culture and of Finance to charge fees for use of works
deemed to be in the public domain.  See id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra
note 6, at 182 (noting that works belonging “to the common cultural heritage,” or public
definition could include folklore.
Cameroonian law similarly extends copyright protection to “works
derived from folklore.”242  Before any commercial exploitation of
folklore may occur, users must seek permission from the National
Copyright Corporation (“Corporation”), which was created to
represent the interests of authors and to regulate the use of folklore
in Cameroon.243  The Corporation is authorized to recruit agents
throughout the country to assist in bringing infringement actions
against unlawful users of protected works.244
In the Central African Republic, the Central African Copyright
Office must authorize the commercial exploitation of folklore.245  It is
a criminal offense to exploit a work of folklore without prior
authorization.246  Fees collected from the use of folklore are allocated
between the author and the copyright office under a precise
formula.247  The copyright office tends to use its share of the fees for
cultural and welfare purposes.248  Notably, Central African Republic
law exempts folklore from the fifty-year term of protection that
generally applies to other copyrightable works.249
Senegalese copyright law is remarkably similar to the Central
African Republic’s law because it requires prior authorization from
the Copyright Office to use folklore, and it charges folklore users a
fee.250  Senegal also criminalizes the importation of works into
                                                 
domain, include works by unknown authors, owners who waived copyright protection, foreign
authors not residing in Mali, deceased authors without heirs, and authors whose term of
protection has expired).
242. See Law No. 82-18 to Regulate Copyright (Cameroon) § 6(c) (Nov. 26, 1982), reprinted
in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 360, 360-61.  “Work derived from folklore”
refers to “work based on facts and ideas borrowed from the traditional cultural heritage of the
country.”  Id. § 4(vii), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 360.
243. See id. §§ 51, 55(1)-(2), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at
365-66.  The National Copyright Corporation in Cameroon may condition its approval on the
payment of appropriate fees.  See id. § 55(2), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra
note 46, at 366.
244. See id. § 56, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 366.
245. Ordinance No. 85-002 on Copyright (Central African Republic) art. 9 (Jan. 5, 1985),
reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 158, 160.
246. See id. art. 46, reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 164.
247. For folklore compilations, the fees are split equally between the compiler and the
Central African Copyright Office, but for folklore adaptations, 75% of the fees are distributed
to the author of the adapted works and 25% to the Central African Copyright Office.  See id.
art. 9, reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 160.
248. See id., reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 160.
249. See id. art. 41(1), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 163.
250. See Law on the Protection of Copyright (Senegal) art. 9 (Dec. 4, 1973), reprinted in 10
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 51, at 211, 212.  The fees are split equally between the
compiler and the Senegalese Copyright Office, but for uses of adaptations of folklore, 75% of
the fees are distributed to the author of the adapted works and 25% to the Senegalese
Copyright Office.  See id., reprinted in 10 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 51, at 212.
Senegal that violate its copyright law.251  Because folklore is protected
under the copyright law as part of its national cultural heritage,252 a
provision that criminalizes the import of all works that violate the
copyright law should be helpful to the protection of folklore.253
2. Problems with references to folklore in copyright laws
Despite descriptions of the term “folklore,”254 the statutory
references in African legislation suffer from certain definitional
deficiencies.  One problem concerns the absence of criteria for
determining the size of the social group relevant to the formation of
a work of folklore.255  For example, in addition to the practices of
tribal groups, would folklore also encompass practices found amongst
lineages, the smaller social groups of tribes?  When does a work fail to
qualify as folklore because the creating group is too small?  This
definitional problem exists because social groups rarely have clear-cut
boundaries and may involve a “gradient of more or less inclusive
groups that live in a certain region, have similar histories, and share
many cultural traits.”256
A related problem is the nature of the practices required to classify
a particular work as folklore.  African legislation specifically
referencing folklore provides no guidance as to how widespread a
cultural practice must be to constitute folklore.  Furthermore, the
legislation does not consider whether modifications to a pre-existing
cultural practice could be regarded as a new work, thereby providing
                                                 
251. See id. art. 46, reprinted in 10 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 51, at 217.
252. See id. art. 9, reprinted in 10 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 51, at 212
(defining folklore and “works inspired by folklore” as part of the country’s national cultural
heritage).
253. See Ndoye, supra note 3, at 377 (discussing the interrelationship between Senegalese
copyright law and the Senegalese criminal law).
254. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 53 (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 435; Copyright Decree (Nigeria) § 28(5) (Dec. 19, 1988), reprinted
in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 1, 8; supra notes 44-
45 and accompanying text (defining folklore in Ghana and Nigeria).
255. See Fernando Santos Granero, Michael F. Brown’s Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 214, 214 (1998) (commentary) (explaining Brown’s observations
regarding the difficulty of measuring a cultural group within a specified boundary and
explaining that this problem is further compounded by influential interactions with other
groups).
256. Id.  Writing about Latin America, Granero notes:
[T]he Aguaruna people of the Upper Mayo River studied by Brown are a somewhat
distinct offshoot of the Aguaruna of the Maranon River, who in turn have
relationships of alliance and hostility with a number of other Jibaro-speaking peoples
on both sides of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian frontier.  Whose culture should we
copy-right?  That of the Upper Mayo Aguaruna, that of the Aguaruna as a whole, that
of the Aguaruna and the Huambisa, who are now organized in a common ethnic
federation, or that of the Jibaro as a whole?
Id.
the persons responsible for the modifications with individual
intellectual property rights.257
Notions of nationality and territoriality are prominent in stating
rights to folklore, and they further compound the definitional
deficiencies in African copyright legislation.  The borders of African
states typically cut through many ethnic communities; therefore,
basing the protection of folklore on concepts of nationality poses
unique problems with identifying the proper communities to control
the national and foreign use of the folklore.258
For instance, with regard to national control, Ghanaian copyright
legislation criminalizes the importation of copies of works made
outside Ghana incorporating Ghanaian folklore.259  However, given
that the Ewe community is straddled across both sides of the Ghana-
Togo border,260 could work produced in Togo using the folklore of
the Togolese Ewes that is also common to the Ghanaian Ewes
criminally violate the Ghanaian law?  Are Togolese Ewes for purposes
of Ghanaian legislation excluded as a legitimate ethnic community in
any analysis of a work of folklore?  If a court narrowly defines the
ethnic community in terms of only Ghanaian Ewes, it is likely to
disallow proof of competing Togolese claims in the work of
folklore,261 which may lead to an unfair conviction.  Without clear
proof of the inappropriate use of techniques specific to Ghana, there
is simply no justification for penalizing the importation of an item
legitimately produced elsewhere that happens to resemble a
Ghanaian product.  To avoid this absurd result, a provision must be
                                                 
257. Granero further writes:
Although cultural forms may be collectively constructed, cultural products are always
the output of particular individuals.  In fact, among Amerindian peoples an
individual’s high prestige is very much dependent upon masterful production,
whether of a basket, a dugout, a garden, a song, or a mythical narration.  Cultures are
not merely replicated ad infinitum by their bearers but constantly enriched by the
latter’s creative acts.  Thus, if it were possible to copyright cultures, who would reap
the profit from the marketing of specific products, the collectivity or the individual?
Id.
258. An anthropologist explains the dilemma as follows:
Now, if there is a lesson that we have learned from anthropology, it is the impossibility
of conceiving cultures as bounded territorial wholes defined by sets of substantive
attributes.  Who will decide, then, and how, that a specific social grouping does or
does not qualify as a genuine native minority, ethnic nation, folkloric community, or
whatever you choose to name the culturally unique potential beneficiaries of a special
regime of collective intellectual property rights?
Phillepe Descola, Michael F. Brown’s Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
208, 209 (1998) (commentary).
259. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 46(1)-(2), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW,
supra note 44, at 434.
260. See ANDREW OFOE AMEGATCHER, GHANAIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT 23 (1996).
261. Evidentiary difficulties pertaining to proof of custom in other countries may also lead
the court to discount claims of similarities in the making of works of folklore.  See id.
made to exempt from criminalization imported works that are made
in bordering countries using folklore similar to that of a particular
country.
Related to this problem is the question of control of the use of
works of folklore abroad when those works are also common to
ethnic groups spanning several countries.262  For example, kente cloth,
which is widely used in the United States for making garments, ties,
caps, bags, stoles, etc., is produced by the Ashanti, Ewe and Nzima
communities found in Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Togo.263  While it is
obvious that those communities have valid claims with respect to the
use of their kente pieces abroad, it is unclear how and to what degree
the relevant national governments are justified in asserting rights on
behalf of their respective nationals.264
An equally important consideration is whether African copyright
legislation that fails to provide appropriate exemptions for folklore
may result in charging members of the ethnic community from which
the folklore originates a fee to use their own folklore.265  In fact, by
requiring users to obtain permission from the relevant copyright
agency prior to any commercial use of folklore, the African statutes
appear to impinge on the rights of the traditional communities to
commercialize those rights—rights which may have existed to a
limited degree in the past.266
The statutes are also subject to criticism for excluding ethnic
communities from arrangements for sharing revenues derived from
either the use of folklore or from the damages received in
infringement actions.267  In Ghana, for example, any such fees are
used to promote institutions for the benefit of authors, performers
and translators.268  In Nigeria, however, the legislation does not
specify any methods for disposing of revenues or damage awards.269
Using the funds collected for national cultural and social objectives,
                                                 
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See COLSON & GLUCKMAN, supra note 68, at 104 (describing the commercial
transactions of the Plateau Tonga communities who traditionally were able to participate in “a
small casual trade in handicrafts within the village and within neighbourhoods of villages”).
267. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 5(4) (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423, 424 (stating that funds received from folklore shall be paid to a
fund established by the Secretary); Copyright Decree (Nigeria) § 15 (Dec. 19, 1988), reprinted in
25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 1, 5.
268. See Copyright Law (Ghana) § 25(d), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra
note 44, at 430; see also supra note 216 (explaining that fees collected by the Secretary go to
institutions working for the benefit of authors, performers, and translators).
269. See Copyright Decree (Nigeria) § 15(1), reprinted in 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW,
supra note 3, at Nigeria, text 1-01, page 5.
or for a narrow group of authors, seems unfair to traditional
communities that have even greater claims to the folklore.
Moreover, the legislation does not provide guidance regarding the
adequacy of the fees charged for the use of folklore or the methods
used to determine the value of each item of folklore.270  Additionally,
the African legislation does not provide alternative forms of
compensation (such as a share of royalties or profits) for certain types
of folklore like plant varieties271 or medicinal plants272 where the
returns to research groups or pharmaceutical companies from
exploiting this folklore can be astronomical.273  In any event, in the
face of a disturbingly low number of foreign requests for permission
to use African folklore,274 the revenue-raising potential of folklore
continues to be bleak under these laws, to the obvious detriment of
traditional communities.
III. PROTECTION UNDER REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
There are two regional arrangements in Africa that deal with
intellectual property matters:  a group somewhat misleadingly
referred to as the Industrial Property Organization for English-
speaking Africa (“ESARIPO”);275 and a group of French-speaking
countries known as the African Intellectual Property Organization
(“OAPI”).276
                                                 
270. For a discussion on the adequacy of compensation for use of folklore, see generally
McGowan & Udeinya, supra note 14, at 59.  McGowan and Udeinya describe a project in Nigeria
to collect traditional medicinal plants and discuss the up-front payments, royalties and
distribution of such proceeds.  See id. at 59, 63-65.
271. The international seed industry is said to account for over U.S. $15 billion per year,
much of that derived from “genetic materials from crop varieties ‘selected, nurtured, improved
and developed by innovative Third World farmers for hundreds, even thousands of years.’”
Darrell Addison Posey, Intellectual Property Rights:  What is the Position of Ethnobiology?, 10 J.
ETHNOBIOLOGY 93, 97 (1990).
272. See id. (“The annual world market value of medicines derived from medicinal plants
discovered by indigenous peoples is estimated at U.S. $43 billion.”).
273. See Elizabetsky, supra note 10, at 11-12 (describing the vast amount of money made in
industrial nations by transferring biotic products from Third World countries).
274. For example, American musician Paul Simon requested permission to use a popular
local tune Yaa Amponsah as the basis for a track in his album, The Rhythm of the Saints.  In 1990,
he signed an agreement with the copyright office granting him permission to use the popular
local tune.  This request, however, is the only request to use folklore on record in Ghana.  See
AMEGATCHER, supra note 260, at 22.
275. See Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs Within the Framework of the Industrial
Property Organization for English-Speaking Africa (ESARPIO) (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter
Protocol], reprinted in 22 INDUS. PROP.:  MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Multilateral
Treaties, text 1-008, page 001 [hereinafter 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY].  It is erroneous to view
membership in the organization as restricted only to English-speaking African countries
because membership is actually open to all members of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa.  See J.H. Ntabgoba, Contribution of ESARIPO to the Development of Industrial
Property Laws in the SADCC Group Countries, 2 LESOTHO L.J. 155, 155 (1986).
276. See African Intellectual Property Organization, discussed in B. Cazenave, The African
A. ESARIPO
Created in 1976277 to harmonize the industrial property activities of
its members,278 ESARIPO has adopted a protocol which authorizes its
Secretariat to grant patents, register industrial designs and administer
the patents and industrial designs on behalf of its members.279  An
application for a patent or registration of an industrial design is
usually made by an interested party at the industrial property office of
a member state and promptly communicated to the Secretariat.280
The Secretariat initially examines the application for compliance
with the formal requirements and then determines the appropriate
filing date for it.281  If an application conforms with the requirements,
then that fact is communicated to each designated state;282 however, if
the application fails to conform to the requirements, the applicant
may change the application within a limited time period.283  If the
                                                 
Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) from Libreville to Bangui, 19 INDUS. PROP.:  MONTHLY REV.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 291, 291 (1980) [hereinafter OAPI] (providing a detailed analysis
of the OAPI terms).
277. The idea to form a regional arrangement for handling intellectual property issues was
conceived in October 1972 when participants at a World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) conference in Nairobi, Kenya endorsed a proposal of the Economic Commission for
Africa (“ECA”) “to convene a meeting of Registrars-general and Heads of the Industrial
Property Offices in the English-speaking countries.”  See Ntabgoba, supra note 275, at 155-56
(explaining the historical background of ESARIPO).  The ECA and WIPO met in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia in June 1974, and drafted the preliminary terms of the Agreement on the Creation of
an Industrial Property Organization for English-speaking Africa.  See id. at 156.  Following other
reviews, the final draft was signed by accredited representatives from Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius,
Somalia, Uganda, and Zambia.  See id. at 157.  After ratification by Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia,
and accession to the Agreement by Gambia and Malawi, it became operational on February 15,
1978.  See id.  Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania,
and Zimbabwe have since joined the arrangement.  See id. at 157.
278. The objectives of the Organization include “the establishment of such common
services or organs as may be necessary or desirable for the co-ordination, harmonization and
development of the industrial property activities affecting its members.”  Protocol, supra note
275, at Preamble, reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multinational
Treaties, text 1-008, page 001.
279. See Protocol, supra note 275, § 1, reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275,
at Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 001.
280. See id. § 2(1)-(2), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral
Treaties, text 1-008, page 001.
281. See id. §§ 3(2)(a), 4(2)(a), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 002.  Each application must identify the applicant and the
Contracting States in which the rights are to be enforced as well as include a payment of the
appropriate fees.  See id. § 3(1)(iii)-(iv), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 002.  For patents, the application should also describe the
invention, state a claim, provide an abstract, and include drawings where necessary.  See id.
§ 3(1)(ii), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral Treaties, text 1-
008, page 002.  For industrial designs, the application should include a reproduction of the
industrial design.  See id. § 4(1)(ii), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 003.
282. See id. §§ 3(2)(c), 4(2)(c), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, pages 002, 003.
283. See id. §§ 3(2)(b), 4(2)(b), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
application is for a patent, the Secretariat also conducts a substantive
examination of the application to determine whether it satisfies the
patentability criteria that inventions be “new, . . . involve an inventive
step . . . and be industrially applicable.”284  The Protocol provides no
explicit criteria for determining the registrability of industrial
designs.  However, because a state can reject the registration of an
industrial design on the ground that it is not “new,” it may be
assumed that to qualify for registration under the ESARIPO
framework, an industrial design must be at least new.285
When the Secretariat informs a designated state about its receipt of
a conforming application for registration of an industrial design, or
its decision to grant a patent, the state must, within six months of the
notice, object to the registration of the design286 or grant of the
patent.287  If no objection is lodged, the requested right becomes
effective automatically in its territory after the six-month period.288
The patents so granted are subject to the laws in each designated
state “on compulsory licenses, forfeiture or the use of patented
inventions in the public interest.”289  Registered industrial designs
                                                 
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, pages 002, 003.
284. See id. § 3(3), 3(9), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral
Treaties, text 1-008, page 002.
285. See id. §§ 4(2)(c), 4(3)-(4), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 003 (discussing the reasons that a State may reject the
registration of an industrial design).  Under the Protocol, an invention is considered “new”
when:
[I]t is not anticipated by prior art.  Everything made available to the public anywhere
in the world by means of written disclosure (including drawings and other
illustrations) or by use or exhibition shall be considered prior art provided that such
making available occurred before the date of filing of the application or, if priority is
claimed, before the priority date validly claimed in respect thereof and further
provided that a disclosure of the invention at an official or officially recognized
exhibition shall not be taken into consideration if it occurred not more than six
months before the date of filing of the application or, if priority is claimed, before the
priority date validly claimed in respect thereof.
Id. § 3(9), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral Treaties, text 1-
008, page 002.
286. See id. § 3(5), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral
Treaties, text 1-008, page 002.  The grounds for objection are “that the industrial design is not
new; that, because of the nature of the industrial design, it cannot be registered or a
registration has no effect under the national law of that State; or that, in the case of a textile
design, it is the subject of a special register.”  Id. § 4(3), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,
supra note 275, at Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 003.
287. See id. §3(6), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral
Treaties, text 1-008, page 002.  Grounds for objecting are “that the invention is not patentable
in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, or that, because of the nature of the
invention, a patent cannot be registered or granted or has no effect under the national law of
that State.”  Id. §§ 3(6)(i)-(iii), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at
Multilateral Treaties, text 1-008, page 002.
288. See id. §§ 3(7), 4(4), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral
Treaties, text 1-008, pages 002, 003.
289. Id. §§ 3(11), 4(7), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral
must follow “applicable national law on compulsory licenses or the
use of registered designs in the public interest.”290
It is apparent from the above description that the ESARIPO
framework would be of limited use in the protection of folklore.
First, it deals with patents and industrial designs, but not copyright—
an area in which the bulk of intellectual property right claims to
folklore may be asserted.291  Second, the ESARIPO’s criteria with
respect to patents are the same as those found in national laws, and
are therefore subject to the same limitations on protecting folklore
discussed earlier.292  Finally, as the Protocol deals with industrial
designs without providing any clear criteria, it is difficult to
determine whether any aspects of folklore, such as clothing designs,
would qualify for protection under that system.
B. OAPI
OAPI was created in Libreville, the capital of Gabon, in 1962 by a
number of French-speaking African states to administer shared
intellectual property matters.293  The Libreville Agreement has since
been replaced by another agreement signed in 1977 in Bangui, the
capital of the Central African Republic.294  Unlike ESARIPO, OAPI
administers detailed schemes pertaining not only to patents, but also
to trademarks and copyrights.295
Patent applications may be made directly to the national OAPI
office by an individual domiciled in an OAPI member state, or
through an agent in a member state if the individual is not domiciled
in a member state.296  An invention qualifies for protection under the
OAPI framework if it is novel, involves an inventive step, and is
                                                 
Treaties, text 1-008, pages 002, 003.
290. Id. § 4(7), reprinted in 22 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, supra note 275, at Multilateral Treaties,
text 1-008, page 003.
291. See Gavrilov, supra note 18, at 78.
292. See supra notes 177-213 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty with applying
the intellectual property rights criteria of categorization, ownership, originality, inventiveness,
and distinguishable characteristics to folklore).
293. See OAPI, supra note 276, at 291 (providing an overview of the Libreville Agreement
signed in 1962 and the Bangui Agreement that was based on the Libreville Agreement).  The
States that were party to the Agreements include:  Benin (formerly Dahomey), Burkina Faso
(formerly Upper Volta) Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire,
Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.  See id.  Madagascar has since withdrawn
from the Libreville Agreement; Mali and Togo have joined.  See id. at 291, 293 (noting that Mali
joined the later Bangui Agreement while Togo acceded to the Libreville Agreement).
294. See id.
295. See id. at 297-99 (discussing OAPI’s trademark provisions); id. at 304-06 (discussing
OAPI’s copyright provisions).
296. See id. at 295 (citing Article 11 of the Bangui Agreement which describes the elements
of a patent application).
industrially applicable.297
A patent owner has the right, subject to the defense of personal
possession,298 to prohibit third parties from exploiting the
invention.299  The OAPI arrangement is unique because the twenty-
year term of patent protection is divided into three periods with the
last two periods subject to compulsory licensing.300  Remedies for
infringement actions may be of either a criminal or civil nature, and
may include a criminal prosecution of the suspected infringer, as well
as issuance of a seizure order.301
Any party may register a trade or service mark with OAPI.302  The
right to the mark is determined by registration and not by use.303  To
qualify for registration, the mark must be sufficiently distinctive, must
consist exclusively of generic or descriptive signs, and must not be
likely to deceive the public.304  Protection is granted for renewal every
ten years.305  The same remedies available in patent infringement
actions can be sought in infringement actions involving trademarks
or service marks.306
Special provisions apply to designs and trade names.  A design is
registrable if it is new and independent of any technical
characteristic.307  In general, a name can take any form, although
names that are deemed to be contrary to public policy, morality or
are likely to deceive the public are prohibited.308  The owner of a
                                                 
297. See id. at 293 (noting the similarities between the conditions required to obtain a
patent under the Bangui Agreement and those generally required to obtain a patent under
European laws).  Patent protection is denied to computer programs and biological processes,
but is recognized for pharmaceutical products.  See id. (citing Article 5 of the Bangui
Agreement).
298. See id. at 294 (citing Article 1(2) and Annex I of the Bangui Agreement) (discussing
the rights of patent owners).  The concept of personal possession is a carryover from French law
and allows the party who had possession of the invention prior to the patent application to
continue to use the patent for his own benefit.  See id.
299. See id. (“Prohibition relates to the making, importing, offering for sale, selling and use
of the patented product, or the stocking of the product for one of those purposes.”).
300. See id.  A compulsory license is a license granted pursuant to national copyright
legislation to allow parties to make use of copyrighted material without the explicit permission
of the copyright owner, on payment of a specified royalty.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 288
(6th ed. 1990).
301. See OAPI, supra note 276, at 295 (describing Articles 58-68 of the Bangui Agreement).
302. See id. at 297 (discussing Article 9 of the Bangui Agreement).
303. See id. (explaining that trademark protection affords legal security to both the owner of
the mark as well as third parties).
304. See id.
305. See id. at 298 (noting that the renewal term has been reduced from 20 years to 10
years).
306. See id. (describing Article 3 of the Bangui Agreement).
307. See id. at 300.
308. See id. at 301.  The right to a trade name belongs to any owner of a trade, industrial
craft or agricultural enterprise located in a member state.  See id. (citing Article I of the Bangui
Agreement).  Under the framework, foreign trade names will not qualify for protection unless
trade name may seek injunctive relief and damages for acts deemed
prejudicial to his right in his trade name, but he may not seek the
type of seizure order available in infringement actions concerning
patents, trademarks or designs.309
With regard to copyright protection, there is no need to file with
OAPI as the right vests automatically with the author.310  Copyright is
recognized during the life of the author and fifty years after his
death.311  Infringement actions may be brought by authors or by
copyright societies acting on behalf of their members.312
Unlike ESARIPO, the OAPI arrangement contains special
provisions relating to folklore.  In OAPI, folklore is defined as works
that are “created by the national ethnic communities in member
states which are passed from generation to generation.”313  Works of
folklore are considered part of the national heritage and their
exploitation is conditioned on notice to the appropriate state
agency.314  Fees collected for such exploitation are to be used for
social or cultural purposes.315
In addition, a number of provisions are devoted to protection of
the national heritage, which in addition to folklore, includes
architectural works, sites and all objects of archaeological, historical,
literary, artistic or scientific importance.316  The OAPI Agreement
requires each member state to compile a list of national heritage
property within six months of the adoption of the Bangui
Arrangement.317  Property identified in the list is protected from
disposal of any kind or exploitation for profit without
authorization.318  Owners, holders, and occupiers of national heritage
property would be informed about their property’s status, and would
                                                 
the owner also owned a business in a member state.  This requirement may be circumvented,
however, by simply filing the name as a trademark.  See id.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 304.  Copyrighted works may be used without the author’s permission for
private use, quotations, reporting and pedagogical purposes.  See id. at 305.
311. See id.  When the copyright term expires, the work falls into the public domain.  See id.
Any party wishing to exploit works in the public domain must pay a fee to a designated national
agency.  See id.  The funds so collected are designated for the government to be used for social
or educational purposes.  See id.
312. See id.  Seizure orders entitling authors to revenue from the unauthorized use of their
copyrighted works may be sought in an infringement action.  After a seizure order has been
granted, however, the applicant must file a court claim within a month or else he will lose all
rights he had gained through the seizure action.  See id.
313. Id. at 304 (citing Article 8 of the Bangui Agreement).
314. See id.
315. See id. (noting that principles of French copyright law “include[] attributes of an
intellectual nature and not an economic nature”).
316. See id. at 306 (citing Article 45 of the Bangui Agreement).
317. See id.  Under the statute, the period could be extended to 18 months.  See id.
318. See id.
be required to notify the relevant government agency of any plans to
alter or sell the property.319  At its own expense, the state may choose
to restore any national heritage property.320  When this occurs, the
owner may not object to the restoration work, and must permit
agents of the government access to the property.321  The property
owner, however, would be reimbursed for any losses suffered during
the possession of the property by the government.322
On the whole, the OAPI arrangement provides a better regime for
protecting folklore than the arrangement under ESARIPO.  It
contains provisions dealing specifically with copyright and includes
criteria for determining the registrability of designs.  However, to the
extent that its criteria for protecting intellectual property rights
mirror national intellectual property legislation, it also suffers from
the same deficiencies noted above regarding national intellectual
property laws.323
Nevertheless, a welcome development in the OAPI arrangement is
its reference to folklore.  The list of national heritage property that
OAPI requires each state to create could potentially improve the
protection of folklore if the states include on their lists all relevant
items of folklore.  It is doubtful, however, that any OAPI country has
compiled such a comprehensive list to date.  Even if sincere efforts
have been made to generate such a list, there is always the possibility
that it may not be exhaustive, either because of logistical reasons or
simply because some works of folklore are not deemed to be of
“archeological, historical, literary, artistic or scientific importance.”324
IV. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON FOLKLORE
A. Berne Convention
Conspicuously absent from the early international instruments on
intellectual property are any references to folklore, perhaps because
the general public availability of such works made protection
concerns moot.325  A revision of the Berne Convention in 1967,
                                                 
319. See id.  The agency must be notified at least 15 days prior to any proposed sale or
transfer of listed property so that it has the option of blocking the sale or transfer of the
property if deemed necessary.  See id.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id. (describing such losses in terms of occupancy rights).
323. See supra notes 177-213 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of extending
intellectual property laws to protect folklore).
324. See OAPI, supra 276, at 306 (discussing Article 45 of the Bangui Agreement).
325. As some Brazilian officials explained:
[Folklore] did not normally form part of copyright codes.  This they attributed to the
however, added a provision of potentially useful application to
folklore.  Under the amendment, contracting states may designate
competent bodies to represent unknown authors of unpublished
works and notify the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) about the authority of such bodies.326  Conceivably, a state
could take advantage of this provision and use it to create an
organization with the authority to protect expressions of folklore.
It is doubtful, however, whether the provision can actually be used
in relation to folklore.  First, because folklore is not mentioned in the
amendment to the Berne Convention, it is not altogether clear how
the amendment applies to folklore.327  Second, it may be difficult to
apply the amendment to folklore, which usually involves communal
rights, because the amendment is phrased in terms of individual
rights.328  Third, to date, no state has notified the WIPO about the
creation of any such competent bodies.329
B. Development of National Model Laws
The next major development in the international legal protection
of folklore was the preparation by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) and WIPO of the
Tunis Model Copyright Law (“Tunis Model Law”) in 1976.  The
Tunis Model Law was intended to be used as a guideline in drafting
national copyright legislation.330  The Tunis Model Law protects
                                                 
fact that, in the last century, when the protection of copyright became a question of
international interest, the more advanced countries, particularly in Europe, had
already collected, studied and disclosed their national folklore in scientific
publications and certain of them had even gone so far as to draw up folklore atlases
containing all the relevant data and analyses.  It would therefore have been
inconceivable for anyone to have the audacity to claim authorship of literary and
musical works which were universally known as being a collective folk work.
Chaves, supra note 6, at 126.
326. Article 15(4) of the 1967 Berne Convention now provides:
(a) In the case of the unpublished works where the identity of the author is unknown,
but where there is every ground to presume that he is a national of a country of the
Union, it shall be a matter for legislation in that country to designate the competent
authority which shall represent the author and shall be entitled to protect and enforce
his rights in the countries of the Union . . . .  (b) Countries of the Union which make
such designation under the terms of this provision shall notify the director general [of
WIPO] by means of a written declaration giving full information concerning the
authority so designated.
Berne Convention of September 9, 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
15(4), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 249 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
327. See Janice G. Weiner, Protection of Folklore:  A Political and Legal Challenge, 18 INT’L REV.
INDUS. PROP. L. & COPYRIGHT 56, 88 (1987).
328. See Farley, supra note 181, at 43 n.166 (citing SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:  1886-1986, at 313 (1987)).
329. See Puri, supra note 190, at 306-07.
330. See TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT (1976), reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY REV.
folklore and works derived therefrom as original works for an
indefinite period331 whether or not the expression of folklore is fixed
in a material form.332  The Model Law also creates moral and
economic rights to be administered by a competent authority
established by the state.333  Fees collected by this authority in
exchange for the use of folklore would be used to benefit authors
and performers and to protect and disseminate national folklore.334
The Tunis Model law appears to have met the expectations of its
proponents as it may have influenced quite significantly the copyright
laws of a number of African countries including Burundi,335
Cameroon,336 Ghana,337 Guinea,338 the Ivory Coast,339 Mali340 and
Congo.341  Its relevance to protecting folklore is reflected by the fact
that countries such as Algeria,342 Kenya,343 Senegal344 and Tunisia345 had
                                                 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 165, 165 (1976) [hereinafter 12 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW]
(stating that purpose of the Model Law was to promote international dissemination and
protection of copyrighted works); Farley, supra note 181, at 43 (explaining that the model law
was intended to provide a model for developing countries to create copyright legislation).
331. See TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 2(1)(iii), 6(2), reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 330, at 168, 171.
332. See id. § 1(5), reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 330, at 167.  The
drafters of the Tunis Model Law offered the following justification for exempting folklore from
the fixation requirement:
[T]he fixation requirement cannot possibly apply to works of folklore:  such works
form part of the cultural heritage of peoples and their very nature lies in their being
handed on from generation to generation orally or in the form of dances whose steps
have never been recorded; the fixation requirement might, therefore, destroy the
protection of folklore . . . .  Consequently, . . . the authors of the Model Law have
made an exception to the fixation rule, particularly since, if this rule were sustained,
the copyright in such works might well belong to the person who takes the initiative of
fixing them.
Farley, supra note 181, at 44.
333. See TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT § 5, reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW,
supra note 330, at 170 (discussing moral rights of authors); id. § 4, reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT
MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 330, at 167 (outlining economic rights related to protected
works); id. § 6 cmt. (explaining that moral and economic rights will be exercised by the
competent state authority); see also § 18(iii) (defining the competent state authority).
334. See id. § 14 cmt., reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 330, at 177.
335. See Decree-Law Regulating the Rights of Authors and Intellectual Property (Burundi)
(May 4, 1978), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 120.
336. See Law No. 82-18 to Regulate Copyright (Cameroon) § 6(c) (Nov. 26, 1982), reprinted
in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 360.
337. See Copyright Law (Ghana) (Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 44, at 423.
338. See Law Adopting Provisions on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Revolutionary
People’s Republic of Guinea) (Aug. 9, 1980), reprinted in 17 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY REV. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG. 199 (1981) [hereinafter 17 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW].
339. See Law on the Protection of Intellectual Works (Ivory Coast), No. 78-634 (July 28,
1978), reprinted in 15 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 191 (1979).
340. See Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) (July 12, 1977),
reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 6, at 180.
341. See Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) (July 7, 1982), reprinted in 19
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 201 (1983).
342. See Copyright Ordinance (Algeria) (Apr. 3, 1973), reprinted in 9 COPYRIGHT:  MONTHLY
adopted laws similar to the Model Law before it was prepared.
Since 1973, UNESCO has worked in earnest on issues related to
the protection of folklore.  In conjunction with WIPO, it organized a
Committee of Experts to draw up model provisions for national laws
on the protection of folklore according to principles similar to those
of intellectual property law.346  In 1982, the Committee of Experts
released the final text of its Model Provisions for National Laws on
the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation
and Other Prejudicial Actions (“Model Provisions”).347
The Model Provisions employ the terms “expressions” or
“productions” instead of “works” to distinguish between its unique
protection of folklore and ordinary copyright laws.348  Items protected
under the Model Provisions are defined as “productions consisting of
characteristic elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed
and maintained by a community . . . or by individuals reflecting the
expectations of such a community . . . .”349  Under these provisions,
protection is extended to folklore whether it is expressed verbally,350
musically,351 by action,352 or in tangible form.353
Due to the fact that in many countries the rights to folklore vest in
the state,354 the Model Provisions avoid the concept of ownership,
                                                 
REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 201 (1973).
343. See The Copyright (Amendment) Act (Kenya) (May 9, 1975), reprinted in 11 COPYRIGHT:
MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 224 (1975).
344. See Law on the Protection of Copyright (Senegal) (Dec. 4, 1973), reprinted in 10
COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 51, at 211.
345. See Law Relating to Literary and Artistic Property (Tunisia) (Jan. 4, 1967), reprinted in
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 2 (Supp. 1967).
346. See Report of the Working Group on the Intellectual Property Aspects of Folklore
Protection (Feb. 9-13, 1981), reprinted in 15 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 19, 19-23 (1981).
347. See COMMITTEE OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASPECTS
OF THE PROTECTION OF EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE, MODEL PROVISIONS FOR NATIONAL LAWS ON
THE PROTECTION OF EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE AGAINST ILLICIT EXPLOITATION AND OTHER
PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS (1982) [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS], reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL.
(No. 1/2) 62 (1982).
348. See Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 145 (noting that the terms in the Model
Provisions are sui generis).
349. MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 347, § 2, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at
62.
350. Examples of protected verbal expressions include “folk tales, folk poetry and riddles.”
See id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 62.
351. Examples of protected musical expressions include folk songs and instrumental music.
See id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 62.
352. Examples of protected expressions of action include “folk dances, plays and artistic
forms or rituals; whether or not reduced to a material form.”  See id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT
BULL. (No. 1/2), at 62.
353. This category of “tangible forms” includes productions of folk art such as:  “drawings,
paintings, carvings, sculptures, pottery, terracotta, mosaic, woodwork, metalware, jewelry, basket
weaving, needlework, textiles, carpets, costumes, musical instruments [and] architectural
forms.”  Id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 62.
354. See Darrell Addison Posey, Effecting International Change, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q.,
preferring instead to identify a “competent authority” as the main
repository of rights to folklore.355  Accordingly, where protected
expressions of folklore are to be used for profit outside their
traditional or customary context, prior approval must be obtained
from this authority.356  Permission, however, would not be required
where the use of folklore is for educational purposes, is incorporated
in the original work of an author, or is incidental.357  Applications to
use an expression of folklore must be made in writing to the
authority, which may impose fees for such use with the understanding
that the revenues collected will be used either to promote or
safeguard national folklore.358
The Model Provisions require that the origin of the folklore be
acknowledged in printed publications and other communications to
the public by mentioning the community or geographic place from
where the expression was derived.359  The requirement, however, does
not apply to creations of original works inspired by expressions of
folklore or to incidental uses of expressions of folklore.360
The Model provisions allow criminal penalties to be imposed for:
failing to obtain the required written consent prior to use of
protected folklore; failing to acknowledge the source of folklore;
misrepresenting the origin of expressions of folklore; and distorting
works of folklore in any manner considered prejudicial to the honor,
dignity, or cultural interests of the community from which it
originates.361  In addition, objects made in violation of the Model
Provisions and any profits made therefrom can be seized.362  These
remedies may be imposed along with damages and other civil
remedies.363
                                                 
Summer 1991, at 29, 31 (noting that some countries consider the State to be the legal owner of
folkloric traditions).
355. See MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 347, § 9, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2)
64 (1982).
356. See id. § 3, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63.  This approval provision
applies to:  “(i) any publication, reproduction and any distribution of copies of expressions of
folklore; (ii) any public recitation or performance, any transmission by wireless means or by
wire, and any other form of communication to the public, of expressions of folklore.”  See id.,
reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63.
357. See id. § 4, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63.  Incidental use is defined
as:  (1) an expression of folklore utilized in reporting on a current event; or (2) an object
containing an expression of folklore placed on permanent public display.  See id., reprinted in 16
COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63.
358. See id. § 10(1)-(2), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 64.
359. See id. § 5(1), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63.
360. See id., reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63.
361. See id. § 6(1)-(4), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 63-64.
362. See id. § 7, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 64.
363. See id. § 8, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 64 (noting that the imposition
of criminal penalties or a seizure does not affect eligibility for civil relief).
In general, expressions of foreign folklore would be protected
based on reciprocity agreements among countries adopting the
Model Provisions, or based on other international agreements.364
Regrettably, while the Model Provisions contain useful features, to
date, they have not been adopted by any country,365 and therefore, are
without much legal significance.
C. Efforts to Develop an International Instrument
After promulgating the Model Provisions, the Committee of
Experts proceeded to draft an international treaty on folklore366 that
closely tracks the Model Provisions in terms of its definition of
subject-matter,367 remedies for unauthorized use,368 and
acknowledgement of the sources of folklore.369  Under the Draft
Treaty for the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (“Draft Treaty”), each
contracting state would designate a competent authority to
administer the protection of expressions of folklore within the state.370
This authority would request that other states protect expressions
originating in the contracting states’ own territory.371  Written
permission of that authority would be required prior to permitting
commercial uses of folklore in other contracting states.372  To
                                                 
364. See id. § 14(i)-(ii), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 1/2), at 65 (discussing the
protection afforded the expression of folklore developed and maintained in a foreign country).
365. See Darrell Addison Posey, International Agreements and Intellectual Property Right Protection
for Indigenous Peoples, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 223, 231 (discussing the renewal of
international interest in the basic issues adopted by the Model Provisions).
366. Draft Treaty for the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation
and Other Prejudicial Actions (1984) [hereinafter Draft Treaty], reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT
BULL. (No. 2) 34 (1985).
367. See id. art. 1, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 34 (setting forth a definition of
protected expressions of folklore that is identical to the definition found in section 2 of the
Model Provisions).
368. For example, the same criminal penalties, seizure, and damage relief provisions found
in Articles 8-10 of the Draft Treaty are also contained in sections 6-8 of the Model Provisions.
Compare id. arts. 8-10, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 37 (discussing the ability of
each contracting state to seize or claim damages for non-compliance), with supra notes 361-63
and accompanying text (discussing the penalty provisions contained in Model Provisions).
Unlike the Model Provisions, however, the Draft Treaty imposes civil penalties for any use of
folklore that causes “economic harm to the State or community in which the utilized expression
of folklore has originated.”  See Draft Treaty, supra note 366, art. 10, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT
BULL. (No. 2), at 37.
369. See Draft Treaty, supra note 366, art. 7, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 36
(stating a guideline that is identical to section 5 of the Model Provisions).
370. See id. art. 3(1), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 35.
371. See id., reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 35.
372. Permission would be required in connection with “the publication, reproduction,
distribution or importation, for purpose of distribution to the public, of reproductions or
recordings of recitations or performances of expressions of folklore; [or for] the public
recitation or performance of expressions of folklore,” as well as any public broadcast of
facilitate the implementation of this provision, the state-appointed
authority is required to provide information pertaining to the main
characteristics and the source of expressions of folklore originating in
its territory.373
The request to use an expression of folklore would be made to the
competent authority in the state in which the expression of folklore
originates.374  With few exceptions, authorization is expected to be
automatic and expeditious, but it may be conditioned on the
payment of adequate compensation fixed by the competent authority
in the absence of agreement.375  Permission is not required from the
competent body where the use of folklore is for educational
purposes, for creating original literary or artistic works, or for
incidental use.376  The Draft Treaty further provides for national
treatment of foreign works of folklore.377
Like the Model Provisions, the Draft Treaty has no legal
significance because it has not been adopted by any state.378  Getting
states to adopt these instruments has been challenging, and may even
be impossible.379  Opposition to a legally binding international
instrument has been based on grounds of practicality and principle.
While some countries are simply not convinced there is a need to
protect folklore internationally,380 other states see the need for
international action, but would prefer the matter be addressed in a
non-binding declaration rather than a binding treaty.381  The general
perception is that it is simply premature to establish an international
treaty at a time when (1) insufficient evidence is available regarding
the success of protecting expressions of folklore at the national
                                                 
expressions of folklore.  See id. art. 4(1), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 35.
373. See id. art. 4(2), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 35.
374. See id. art. 5(1), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 36 (describing the process
for requesting and granting authorization).
375. See id. art. 5(2), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 36.  A request to use a
folklore expression may be denied where the intended use would be prejudicial to the honor or
dignity of the originating country or community.  The competent authority is required to justify
in writing, any decision to deny a request.  See id., reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 36.
376. See id. arts. 6(1)(i)-(ii), 6(2), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 36.
377. See id. art. 2, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 35 (recommending equal
protection for folklore among the Contracting States regardless of where the expression
originates).
378. See Posey, supra note 354, at 31.
379. See REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE, supra note 28, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL.
(No. 2) 39, 41 (1985) (describing the discussion by delegations of the UNESCO Member States
which emphasized the need for a treaty to protect folklore, but also expressed reservations
about such a treaty).
380. See id., reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 41 (reporting that two delegations
were opposed to adopting any international instrument).
381. See id., reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 41.
level382 and (2) no workable dispute resolution mechanisms have
been designed.383  As the Committee of Experts appeared to
recognize, no state would enter into an obligation under an
international convention protecting foreign expressions of folklore if
it did not know which expressions of other member states’ folklore
really should be protected.384  Moreover, for some of the developed
nations with significant numbers of indigenous people such as the
United States, there is a general reluctance to commit to
arrangements that may be perceived as an implicit recognition of the
claims of indigenous people to sovereignty with regard to certain
property.385
V. PROTECTION OF FOLKLORE IN THE UNITED STATES
Because there is, at this time, no binding international instrument
pertaining to the protection of folklore, it is useful to examine
whether laws in countries outside the African continent would afford
any protection to works of folklore illegally taken out of Africa or
mass-produced abroad without proper authorization.  An
examination of intellectual property laws in the United States is
appropriate because large quantities of African folklore are found
and sold here.386
A. Intellectual Property Laws of the United States
Copyright protection in the United States extends to original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.387
Qualified works include literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
motion pictures and audiovisual works, sound recordings and
architectural works.388  While the domicile or nationality of an author
                                                 
382. For example, there is no evidence that any state has adopted the Model Provisions for
National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Works of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation
and Other Prejudicial actions.  See REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 30, reprinted in
19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 21, 23 (1985).
383. See Posey, supra note 354, at 31 (citing the Group of Experts’ 1984 reason for
concluding that an international treaty was premature).
384. See REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE, supra note 28, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL.
(No. 2), at 42 (identifying concerns regarding the definition and scope of protected folklore).
385. For a discussion of how issues of sovereignty are raised by Indian tribes’ claims to their
cultural heritage, see generally Pinel & Evans, supra note 21, at 43-53.
386. Cf. Sassoon, supra note 3, at 47, 49 (discussing a group of Westerners who live in Nepal
and engage primarily in the smuggling of antiquities and relating the story of when the author
entered a New York art gallery and saw a seventeenth-century torana from Nepal).
387. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (outlining categories of original
works afforded copyright protection).
388. See id.
is irrelevant to the protection of unpublished works in the United
States,389 it may be important with respect to published works.390
Under U.S. copyright law, an author has exclusive rights391 to
reproduce, distribute, perform, display, or make derivative works
from copyrighted works.392  In addition, authors of works of visual art
have certain rights of attribution and integrity and can prevent the
mutilation or distortion of the copyrighted work deemed to prejudice
the honor or reputation of the author.393
Inventions are patentable if they are novel, useful394 and non-
obvious.395  Protection is granted for a nonrenewable term of twenty
years, after which the invention falls into the public domain and can
be used by anyone.396
For a trademark to qualify for registration under the Lanham Act,
the mark must be distinctive.397  The Act prohibits registration of any
“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter . . . which may disparage
or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into
                                                 
389. See id. § 104(a) (stating that unpublished works listed in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 are
protected by copyright laws regardless of the nationality or domicile of the author).
390. See id. § 104(b).  Under section 104(b), published works covered under 17 U.S.C. §§
102-103 are protected if “one or more of the authors is a national or domiciliary of the United
States,” or national or domiciliary of a foreign nation that has a copyright treaty with the United
States, or a stateless person domiciled anywhere, on the date of first publication.  See id. §
104(b)(1).  Copyright protection also applies if the work is published first in the United States
or any foreign nation that is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention on the date of first
publication; if the work is first published by the United Nations or any of its agencies or the
Organization of American States; if the work is covered under the Berne Convention; or if the
work falls within the scope of a Presidential Proclamation.  See id. § 104(b)(2)-(5).
391. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).  The exclusive rights of the author in a
copyrighted work are qualified by the doctrine of fair use.  See id. § 107.  The fair use doctrine
permits use of a copyrighted work without the author’s permission for such purposes as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.  See id.
392. See id. § 106 (describing the exclusive rights of copyright owners, subject to the
limitations in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-120 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)).
393. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).  These rights enable the author of the work of visual art to
claim authorship of the work, to prevent the use of his name as author of any visual work he did
not create, or to prevent the use of his name as the author of visual work in the event of
distortion or mutilation or other modification which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.  See id. § 106A(a).
394. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (“[W]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”).
395. See id. § 103(a) (Supp. I 1995) (requiring that subject matter differences between the
current and prior art be obvious “to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
subject matter pertains” at the time of invention).
396. See id. § 154(a)(2).
397. As provided in the statute:  “No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration . . . .”  Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
contempt, or disrepute.”398
Depending on the intellectual property right involved, the
remedies for infringement range from injunctive relief,399 to seizure
and forfeiture,400 accounting for profits,401 damages,402 attorney’s
fees,403 and costs.404
The intellectual property legislation in the United States does not
specifically address the protection of folklore.405  The regulation of
folklore, if at all, is achieved under the general copyright concepts of
rights to derivative and public domain works.406  After collecting and
compiling works of folk art in the nineteenth century, the United
States has extended copyright protection to such compilations or
works derived therefrom,407 but only to the extent the writing,
                                                 
398. Id. § 1052(a) (Supp. I 1995).
399. See id. § 1116 (allowing courts to grant injunctions to prevent trademark violations); 17
U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (providing that any court with jurisdiction of a civil action arising under
title 17 may grant temporary and final injunctions reasonable for prevention or restraint of a
copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (giving courts the authority to grant
injunctions to prevent patent violations).
400. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 503, 509 (1994).  Section 503(a) allows a court to impound all works
and copies claimed to be in violation of copyright and all items used to create such
reproductions while an action is pending.  See id. § 503(a).  A court may order the destruction
of these items as part of a final judgment under 503(b).  See id. § 503(b).  Section 509 allows the
Treasury Department or any agent authorized by the Attorney General to seize all
phonorecords, including motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and copies in violation
of section 506(a), and the items are forfeited by the possessor.  See id. § 509.
401. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995) (awarding damages for trademark
violations as calculated by the defendant’s profits, plus the plaintiff’s damages and any costs of
the action, the total not to exceed three times the actual damages); 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1994)
(providing that a copyright infringer is liable for either the actual damages suffered by the
owner plus any profits made or statutory damages as awarded by the court).
402. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1994) (assessing damages at three times the profits or
damages “unless the court finds extenuating circumstances”); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994)
(finding the copyright owner entitled to actual damages as a result of the infringement plus any
profits derived therefrom); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1984) (explaining that damages to cover the patent
infringement should not be less than a “reasonable royalty for the use made by the infringer”
with interests and costs and that the court may elect to increase damages up to three times the
assessed amount).
403. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (allowing attorney fees to be awarded in trademark cases
violating section 1114(1)(a) or 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1994) where counterfeit is intentional); 17
U.S.C. § 505 (1994) (stating that the court has discretion in copyright cases to “allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer
thereof . . . [and] may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of
the costs.”); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (awarding attorney fees in “exceptional cases” for patent
violations).
404. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (including the cost of the action as part of the damage
calculation in a trademark dispute); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (instructing courts to include costs as part
of a damage award in patent cases).
405. See Barbara Friedman Klarman, Copyright and Folk Music, 12 BULL. OF THE COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y USA 277, 282 (1965) (suggesting that the absence of a specific reference to folk art in
copyright statutes indicates a failure to acknowledge the special issues of folk art and folk
music).
406. See Weiner, supra note 327, at 73 (describing copyright protection of folklore in
Western countries as being firmly established as part of the public domain).
407. See id.
selection or arrangement reflects an individual and independent
creation.408  The collective nature of folk art made it impossible to
recognize individual rights in folk art,409 which has remained in the
public domain due to problems of fixation, time of creation, and
identity of its authors.410  Therefore, one may properly conclude that
in the United States, folklore is “free for everyone to use and/or
distort, a concept which is not conducive to its protection.”411
B. Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property Rights
The debate about the legal protection of folklore in the United
States has largely taken the form of arguments about the right of
indigenous people to protect aspects of their culture.412  For example,
Native American Indian knowledge, once marginalized, has become
commercially attractive in recent years.413  However, because such
commercialism has also taken a toll on indigenous culture, it has
become necessary to control the exploitation of indigenous
knowledge.414  Intellectual property law has been the leading area for
positing claims to protect indigenous peoples from the devastating
consequences that attend such commercialism.415  The issues may be
framed as follows:
Indigenous societies find themselves poked, probed and
examined as never before.  The very cultural heritage that
gives indigenous peoples their identity, now far more than in
the past, is under real or potential assault from those who
would gather it up, strip away its honored meanings, convert
it to a product, and sell it.  Each time that happens the
heritage itself dies a little, and with it its people.
Indigenous communities, indigenous leaders, and
                                                 
408. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994) (explaining that copyright protection extends only to
that part of the work which is distinguishable from any “pre-existing material”).
409. See Chaves, supra note 6, at 126 (commenting that during the nineteenth century when
copyright became an international issue, many Western countries “collected, studied, and
disclosed” their folklore in scientific publications such that no one could claim authorship of
the body of work “universally known as being a collective folk work”).
410. See Weiner, supra note 327, at 75 (noting that folk songs and folklore in the United
States are in the public domain because the origins of concepts and ideas are of unknown
authorship).
411. Id.
412. See generally Pinel & Evans, supra note 21, at 43 (discussing how tribal sovereignty helps
to define cultural knowledge and allows Native Americans to establish and enforce intellectual
property rights).
413. See Greaves, supra note 1, at ix.
414. See Farley, supra note 181, at 4-5 (discussing the importance of accurately rendering
Aboriginal designs given that such designs are the principal means by which Aboriginal culture
is passed from generation to generation).
415. See id. at 13 (explaining that indigenous people use intellectual property laws “as a
shield to prevent further intrusions into their already pillaged culture”).
advocates for indigenous rights have sought ways to gain
some control in a rapidly worsening situation.  At bottom,
intellectual property rights consist of efforts to assert access
to, and control over, cultural knowledge and to things
produced through its application.  The most urgent reason
to establish that control is to preserve meaning and due
honor for elements of cultural knowledge and to insure that
these traditional universes, and their peoples, maintain their
vitality.  Subsidiary . . . goals are to manage the degree and
process by which parts of that cultural knowledge are shared
with outsiders, and in some instances, to be justly
compensated for it.416
Without making any changes to its intellectual property laws, the
United States government has responded in piece-meal fashion to
some of these concerns.  For instance, it has addressed the issue of
misrepresentation of Indian artifacts,417 by passing in 1935 the Native
American Arts and Crafts Act to assure the authenticity of Indian
artifacts.418  The law created the Indian Arts and Crafts Board with
responsibility for issuing certification marks that will be registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office.419  Under the Act, civil and criminal
penalties would be imposed on individuals caught counterfeiting the
Board’s marks or misrepresenting items as Indian-made.420
Despite its laudable goals, the legislation has not been effective.  So
far, no person has been prosecuted under the Act and the
Department of the Interior has yet to adopt implementing
regulations despite the sixty-year history of the Act.421  In any event,
the Act is unduly narrow in scope and would not apply in cases where
indigenous crafts are copied but not represented as Indian crafts.422
Another significant legal development in connection with the
rights of indigenous people in cultural property was the passage in
                                                 
416. Greaves, supra note 1, at ix.
417. It is not uncommon in the United States to find art and craft produced by non-Indians
being marketed as genuine “Indian” products.  See Farley, supra note 181, at 50 (describing how
indigenous art must compete with cheaper, imported imitations).
418. See 25 U.S.C. § 305 (1994).
419. See id. § 305(a)(g)(3) (giving the Board power to register trademarks with the Patent
and Trademark Office without charge).
420. A 1994 amendment has imposed a maximum fine of $1,000,000 for first-time
counterfeiters and individuals and $5,000,000 for subsequent violations by those other than
individuals.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994).
421. See Leonard D. Duboff, 500 Years After Columbus:  Protecting Native American Culture, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 57 (1992) (indicating that in addition to the failure to prosecute
under the Act, the Interior Department has never created regulations to implement
amendments and no money was budgeted for the Board’s “expanded duties”); Farley, supra
note 181, at 51 (describing the Act’s impotence).
422. See Farley, supra note 181, at 51-52.
1990 of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act423 authorizing the return by museums of human remains and
objects taken from Indian graves.424  Under the statute, persons
requesting such repatriation must demonstrate direct descent in the
case of human remains,425 and prior ownership in the case of
objects.426  Predictably, the law has had a profound effect on the
debate about the rights of Indians to their cultural property and has
emboldened them to seek return of numerous items,427 including
those that may be perceived as falling beyond the scope of the Act.428
The two laws surveyed contain only limited solutions and do not by
any means address the more fundamental difficulties of protecting
folklore429 under broad intellectual property criteria.430  The United
States government has yet to come out with a broad legislative
solution that strikes an adequate balance between the claims of the
indigenous people and the traditional goals of intellectual property
law.431
Opposition to the development of strong intellectual property
rights in cultural property has come from various groups.432  A leading
                                                 
423. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994).
424. For a discussion of the significance of this legislation, see Duboff, supra note 421, at 44
(stating that the Act signifies a change in Congress towards more sensitivity to Native American
culture).
425. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1) (directing Federal Agencies and museums to return human
remains upon the request of a “known lineal descendent”).
426. See id. § 3005(a)(5) (stating that “sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony”
must be returned when requested by a “direct lineal descendant,” a tribe or organization with
proof of prior ownership or control by the tribe or a member).
427. See Brown, supra note 13, at 194.
428. See infra note 542 and accompanying text (noting that the boundaries of the law are
not clear and that the Act has paved the way for broader assertions of control as illustrated
recently by the Hopi Tribe, which claimed an interest in “all published or unpublished field
data . . . including notes, drawings, and photographs, particularly those dealing with religious
matters”).
429. This is especially true for those rights that are not analogous to copyright but, rather
sound in trademarks and patents and therefore, cannot be protected under the limited public
domain concept applicable to copyrights.
430. For a discussion on the application of intellectual property concepts to indigenous
culture, see generally Candace S. Greene & Thomas D. Drescher, The Tipi with Battle Pictures:
The Kiowa Tradition of Intangible Property Rights, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 418, 423-33 (1994)
(describing tribal legalities concerning intangible property rights possessed by the Tipi Indians
ranging from beaded patterns on moccasins to warriors’ right to control “representations” of
their accomplishments).
431. See Brown, supra note 13, at 195 (arguing that the debate over cultural property rights
is too narrow, fostering “bumper-sticker slogans” over a broader debate which recognizes the
difficulty in protecting indigenous populations while allowing a free flow of information).  The
lack of effective solutions has been attributed to the “politically marginal status of many of the
indigenous peoples.”  Id.
432. Predictably, these groups include parties who benefit the most from the current
unregulated regime, such as the pharmaceutical industry and seed companies.  Also included
are anthropologists and ethnobiologists who fear a forced change in profession and subsequent
results such as reduced income.  Under a strong intellectual property regime, anthropologists
skeptic, Professor Michael Brown, has dismissed calls for greater
intellectual property protection for indigenous property as part of “a
polemical romanticism that produces memorable bumper-sticker
slogans (“Give the natives their culture back!”)” without due regard
to the need to maintain the “flow of information . . . .”433  He defends
his position with arguments based on free speech, and the need for
continued access to information, especially information considered
to be in the public domain.434
Brown argues that allowing indigenous communities to maintain a
shroud of secrecy with regard to the use of certain cultural items
would be an affront to the cherished “political ideals of liberal
democracy.”435  Brown further argues that enabling indigenous
communities to recover information already in the possession of
museums would impede the use of material now subject to general
exploitation.436  He also sees free speech implications in
                                                 
and ethnobiologists would now have to share with the indigenous peoples, a portion of their
incomes from books, articles, and films about native peoples.  See Posey, supra note 271, at 95.
433. Brown, supra note 13, at 195 (criticizing characterizations of intangible cultural
property by anthropologists, legal scholars, and indigenous activists).
434. See id. at 206 (stating that it is “time to temper demands for comprehensive
copyrighting of native cultures” with the need to have works in the public domain).
435. See id. at 198.  Professor Brown further notes that:
In the United States, secrecy has long been regarded as inherently inimical to
democratic process and to personal freedom.  There are, of course, circumstances in
which secrecy is warranted:  in matters of national security, in deliberations on
sensitive administrative or legislative matters, in certain kinds of law-enforcement
activities, and so forth.  We also recognize that institutionalized secrecy nearly always
leads to abuses of power.  For this reason, we have implemented a wide range of
“sunshine laws” that require government officials to conduct deliberations in public
and to make administrative documents available to citizens on demand.  There is also
a strong presumption that once information enters the public domain, it should stay
there.  Secrecy, in other words, is inherently threatening to democratic process and to
the public good except in a sharply circumscribed range of situations.  We demand
that our educational, religious, and political institutions practice openness whenever
possible.  Although archives routinely impose restrictions on access—when, for
instance, they abide by a donor’s request that documents be closed to researchers for a
stated period, usually to protect the privacy of living individuals—I know of no cases in
which U.S. public repositories deny access to archived materials on the basis of a
potential user’s ethnicity, gender, age, or religious affiliation.  Such selective
restrictions would surely qualify as a form of illegal discrimination.
Id. at 198.
436. In this context, Professor Brown notes:
Native values and the American legal system are especially prone to collision over the
question of retroactive secrecy, the disposition of information that was obtained in the
past and has long resided in the public domain.  There are few precedents for the
removal of information from the public domain in response to the demands of third
parties asserting a right to determine when, where, and by whom this information is
accessed.  Yet this is exactly what some Indian tribes are asking American museums
and archives to do.  There is no getting around it:  in this case, indigenous beliefs
about knowledge of the sacred conflict directly with the majority’s commitment to the
sacredness of public knowledge.
Id.
recommendations for laws prohibiting the unauthorized use of
indigenous art and symbols by outsiders.437
Professor Brown’s framing of the debate in terms of rights of
private property and absolute rights of access has been challenged as
unduly narrow in scope and reflective of an essentially Eurocentric
perspective438 without regard to the equally important relationships
that traditional communities have in their folklore such as trust and
obligations to relatives and ancestors.439  In any event, the rigid
dichotomy between rights of property and rights of access that he
assumes, is unwarranted even under Western norms.440
In addition, while free speech issues are relevant to the debate,441
they should not necessarily trump interests in protecting folklore as
Professor Brown suggests.  Traditionally, the law has sought to redress
wrongs which carry free speech implications by balancing the
competing interests without presumptively favoring free speech.442
Therefore, to the extent folklore also suffers from injuries that
implicate free speech,443 a balancing act is required rather than an
                                                 
437. His argument is as follows:
[O]ne begins to wonder where the legal prohibition of religious “trivialization” or
sacrilege might lead.  Would citizens therefore be subject to [a] civil and criminal
penalty if they trivialized any religious symbols?  Would indigenous peoples themselves
be subject to reciprocal fine or arrest if they manipulated Christian imagery for their
own purposes?  One can easily imagine conservative evangelical groups taking offense
at the use of Christian symbols by members of the Native American Church during
peyote meetings.  In the American context, certainly, legal efforts to prevent parodic
or creative appropriations of religious symbols would present a serious challenge to
the First Amendment.
Id. at 199.
438. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Michael F. Brown’s Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 207, 207-08 (1998) (commentary).
439. Coombe explains that:
Peoples have other relationships to cultural forms—trust, secrecy, guardianship,
stewardship, initiation, sacralization—and obligations to relatives, ancestors, spirits,
and future generations which make models of access and ownership appear extremely
impoverished.  Such knowledge is not adequately understood as information, nor may
its circulation be properly understood as speech.
Id. at 208.
440. Coombe further notes:
Western notions of property are themselves not nearly as narrow as this dichotomy
between exclusivity of possession and an unrestricted public commons would suggest.
Western juridical traditions recognize relations of trust (express and constructive),
fiduciary obligation, implicit license, breach of confidence, stewardship, and local
observances of negotiated customs and ethics.
Id.
441. For example, free speech issues are implicated in “efforts to prevent parodic or creative
appropriations of religious symbols” as part of the legal protection of folklore.  See Brown, supra
note 13, at 199.
442. See Coombe, supra note 438, at 208 (“First Amendment concerns are indeed raised and
interests in freedom expression balanced, but speech rights have never been recognized as
absolutely trumping claims based upon injuries effected by expressive activities.”).
443. See supra notes 3-22 and accompanying text (discussing examples of authentication,
automatic preclusion of the claims in folklore when they appear to
conflict with free speech concerns.
C. Protecting African Folklore Under U.S. Law
Issues concerning intellectual property rights and indigenous
communities are being debated and hopefully will lead to a
satisfactory resolution in favor of the indigenous peoples.  In the
meantime, the most pressing issue from the perspective of a legal
practitioner concerned with the unauthorized use of African folklore
in the United States is how to secure adequate protection in the U.S.
legal system for the legitimate interest of traditional communities in
their folklore.
Regrettably, intellectual property rights are largely territorial.444
Therefore, parties asserting rights to folklore in American courts on
behalf of African communities would need to demonstrate rights
recognized under U.S. law.  This will not be easy given the difficulties
of protecting folklore under general intellectual property criteria
relating to ownership, originality, duration, inventiveness, fixation
and uniqueness.445
But can the direct intervention of African governments make a
difference?  While African governments are certainly authorized to
litigate abroad on matters pertaining to folklore,446 to the extent the
governments’ claims to folklore are not based on treaty obligations of
the United States, they will face the same evidentiary burdens as
individuals in U.S. courts; the propriety of their claims to folklore
would not automatically be assumed.
Although parties to the Berne Convention,447 the Paris
Convention448 and the Universal Copyright Convention449 have agreed
                                                 
misrepresentation, and debasement of cultural values in the exploitation of folklore, which
implicate free speech issues to the extent that exploiters can claim that their acts of
misrepresentation or debasement were done in the exercise of their constitutional rights).
444. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:  A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 721 (3d ed. 1995) (finding that because intellectual property rights are
granted according to national law, the exclusive rights are territorial in nature).
445. See supra notes 177-213 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of fitting
folklore into the current intellectual property criteria).
446. See Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) art. 70 (July 7, 1982), reprinted
in 19 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REVIEW, supra note 46, at 201, 244 (authorizing the national agency
responsible for folklore to “take legal action to defend the interests that are its statutory
responsibility, particularly as regards any litigation directly or indirectly concerning the
reproduction or communication to the public of works covered by this law”).
447. See Berne Convention, supra note 326, art. 5, 828 U.N.T.S. at 231-32 (providing that
states must grant protection to the works of authors from member countries equivalent to the
rights granted to their own nationals).
448. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 2, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 1631 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (granting to “[n]ationals of any country of
to provide national treatment to intellectual property rights
recognized by other contracting states, these obligations pertain to
non-discrimination and do not require states to recognize foreign
intellectual property rights not available to their own citizens.450
Thus, if an African government, as the repository of folklore, were to
seek protection in the United States of a work of folklore on the basis
of these international instruments, it is not likely to succeed since the
United States does not protect works of folklore to the same degree
that the African states do.451  Under those circumstances, the United
States will not be expected to enforce the heightened intellectual
property regime available in Africa.
Accordingly, without specific arrangements worked out with the
U.S. government for special treatment of African folklore, it will likely
be impossible to protect African folklore in U.S. courts.  In the
concluding parts of this Article, I discuss the importance of a
proposed regional institution designed to handle such negotiations.452
VI. A CONSIDERATION OF SOME ALTERNATIVES
The preceding sections discussed significant problems with
protecting folklore under customary law, national legislation,
regional and international laws.  For instance, customary law
protection is limited by its reliance on voluntary compliance with
sanctions based on a system of religious beliefs that do not make
sense to the foreign user of folklore.453  Protection under general
national legislation and regional arrangements is complicated by the
inability to fit folklore into the statutory criteria of individual
                                                 
the Union” the same protection and remedies against infringement that nationals would
receive from their own country).
449. See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, art. 2, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1345, 943
U.N.T.S. 178, 195 [hereinafter Universal Copyright Convention] (providing that each state
shall provide protection to published and unpublished works of nationals of each contracting
state equivalent to that granted to its own nationals).
450. See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 449, art. 2, 25 U.S.T. at 1345, 943
U.N.T.S. at 195 (“For the purpose of this Convention any Contracting State may, by domestic
legislation, assimilate to its own nationals any person domiciled in that State.”); Berne
Convention, supra note 326, art. 3, 828 U.N.T.S. at 231 (“Authors who are not nationals of one
of the countries of the Union but who have their habitual residence in one of them shall, for
the purposes of this Convention, be assimilated to nationals of that country.”); Paris
Convention, supra note 448, art. 3 (providing that “[n]ationals of countries outside the Union
who are domiciled . . . in the territory of one of the countries of the Union shall be treated in
the same manner as nationals of the countries of the Union”).
451. See supra Part V (discussing the protection of folklore under U.S. laws).
452. See infra notes 536-44 and accompanying text (proposing the creation of a specialized
agency concerned with the protection of folklore and discussing its parameters of operation).
453. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with applying
customary law to foreign users of folklore).
ownership, originality, duration, fixation and inventiveness.454
Furthermore, there is as of yet no binding international arrangement
protecting works of folklore.455
Suggestions for improving this unsatisfactory legal regime have
ranged from radical revisions of modern intellectual property laws,456
to the complementary use of laws and policies that do not deal
specifically with folklore, such as moral rights, public domain and
domaine public payant, unfair competition laws, and trade secrets.457
Others propose resorting to general principles of contract law,
human rights and other miscellaneous provisions affecting
indigenous peoples.458  The following sections analyze the
implications of these proposals.
A. Complementary Laws and Policies
1. Moral rights
Scholars urge the recognition of moral rights in folklore as the
solution to problems of distortion, misrepresentation, and
authenticity that frequently accompany the unauthorized use of
folklore.459  The moral rights of divulgation, paternity and integrity460
would be especially useful in protecting folklore from being
“published without . . . authorization, published without attribution,
reproduced in poor quality, reproduced only partially causing the
message to be distorted, or put to a use which would be inappropriate
to the nature of the original work.”461  For this reason, it is not
                                                 
454. See supra notes 177-213 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of fitting
folklore into the current intellectual property criteria).
455. See supra Part IV.C (discussing various attempts at developing an international
agreement protecting folklore).
456. See Greaves, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that some favor the development of a new
legal instrument which would, for example, establish ownership and control that is society-wide
rather than individualized and that would also confer an unending monopoly of ownership).
457. See infra Part VI.A.1-4 (discussing the complementary nature of moral rights, public
domain and domaine public payant, unfair competition laws, and trade secrets laws toward the
protection of folklore).
458. See infra Part VI.A.5-7 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of contract law,
human rights norms, and international measures in protecting folklore as it relates to
indigenous peoples).
459. See Puri, supra note 190, at 332-34 (advocating the use of moral rights to prevent
“debasement, mutilation or destruction” of aboriginal folklore which receives no protection
when displayed or reproduced, especially in countries with Anglo-Saxon legal systems, which
are more concerned with economic rights).
460. The right of divulgation refers to the right of the author to determine if and when his
work will be made public.  See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8[D][05], at 58 (1978).  The right of paternity insures acknowledgement of authorship and
the right of integrity gives the author the right to object to any distortion, alteration, or other
derogation of his work.  See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 444, at 728.
461. Farley, supra note 181, at 48 (discussing the inalienable moral rights of divulgation,
surprising that moral rights have been extended to folklore in both
the Model Provisions462 and the Draft Treaty.463  Where moral rights
are incorporated in national copyright legislation referring to
folklore, they would apply automatically to works of folklore in those
countries.
However, moral rights would be difficult to enforce in the case of
folklore because they suffer from the same limitations as other
concepts of modern intellectual property law.464  Like intellectual
property laws, moral rights are concerned with protecting the
reputation or other interest of the individual rather than that of the
community, and would also be subject to termination after a definite
period.465  As a result, moral rights would be difficult to establish
when community harm is alleged in connection with the
unauthorized use of folklore passed down through many generations.
2. Public domain and domaine public payant
Others see a potential benefit to restrictions regarding the use of
works in the public domain.466  Because works in the public domain
may only be used as the basis of derivative works so long as the use
does not violate the essence of the work,467 it is suggested that these
                                                 
paternity, and integrity and how they can protect indigenous artists).
462. See MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 347, §§ 5-6, reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No.
1/2) 62, 63-64 (1982) (indicating that expressions of folklore should be acknowledged and
outlining the accompanying offenses committed when they are not).
463. See Draft Treaty, supra note 366, arts. 7-8, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 34,
36-37 (1985) (identifying expressions of folklore and the penal sanctions which accompany a
violation).
464. See Farley, supra note 181, at 48 (suggesting that moral rights, like copyright, are
focused on individual authors and therefore may not address the harm done to a community).
465. See id. at 48-49 (finding that protection is terminated upon the authors’ death or a pre-
determined time frame which is not consistent with a community’s perpetual interest in the
work).
466. In Angola, modification of a work in the public domain is permitted if the author is
identified, a reader can distinguish the modifications from the original, and the work as
modified is not prejudicial to his reputation.  In the Ivory Coast, written permission must be
obtained from assignees or beneficiaries prior to use of works in the public domain.  See Study of
Comparative Copyright Law:  Protection of Works in the Public Domain, 15 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2)
30, 32 (1981) (discussing legislation in specific countries which permit the modification or
adaptation of a work in the public domain when certain conditions are met).
467. Explaining the need for restrictions on the use of public domain works, UNESCO’s
Special Committee of Governmental Experts on Safeguarding of Works in the Public domain
notes that:
[W]hile the use of a work in the public domain is free . . . this freedom should not
permit the distortion of a work or the suppression of the name of its author.  Freedom
should be taken to mean that reproduction, performance, translation or adaptation
are permitted without the consent of anybody, but on condition that the essence of
the work is not distorted or lost.  Freedom does not include the right to destroy the
work or impair its nature.
Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain, 23 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 25 (1989) (discussing the
Special Committee of Governmental Experts’ final text of the Draft Recommendation of
restrictions, like moral rights, could be used to prohibit the distortion
of works of folklore.468  However, depending on how the term “public
domain” is defined,469 this form of protection may not be available to
folklore.  Where the public domain concept is premised on eligibility
for copyright protection, it may not apply to folklore given the
difficulties of protecting folklore under general copyright laws.470
Furthermore, the UNESCO Committee looking into the protection
of works in the public domain adopted the position that while the
term “works in the public domain” would extend to all intellectual
works constituting national and international cultural heritage, works
of folklore were specifically excluded.471
Of greater significance is the related concept of domaine public
payant, which refers to a system where the works of unidentified
authors can be exploited subject to the payment of fees to the state.472
As we have seen, a common feature of African copyright legislation is
that works of folklore are typically considered part of the national
heritage and protected as such without any concerns as to whether
they satisfy copyright criteria.473  The vesting of rights to folklore in
the state under these laws solves the problems of identifying legal
persons to assert rights relating to folklore.  This is not a complete
solution, however, as the traditional community does not share in the
fees collected by the state.474
                                                 
Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain to the General Conference of UNESCO).
468. See Farley, supra note 181, at 49 n.203.
469. Consider for example, the following description:
The term “works [in the public domain] means ‘the world’s inheritance of books,
works of art and monuments of history and science . . . and generally speaking, all
intellectual works as defined by the international conventions and national copyright
legislation.  It is also worth while [sic] to point out that this definition would also
include works that have not benefited from copyright protection but would have done
so had it existed or had they been eligible for such protection.
REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE, supra note 28, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 45
(1985).
470. See Farley, supra note 181, at 49 (asserting that folklore will have the same difficulties
under public domain protection with regard to fixation requirements and originality as it does
with copyright law).
471. See Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain, 17
COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 3) 25, 30 (1983) (stating that the term ‘works in the public domain’
“should not be interpreted to include the works of folklore”).
472. See Edwin R. Harvey, The Domaine Public Payant in Comparative Law with Special Reference
to Argentina, 28 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 4) 29 (1994) (providing a comparative review of the
concept of domaine public payant).
473. See supra Part II.B.1 (referring to how African countries’ copyright legislation protects
folklore).
474. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (criticizing existing African statutes for
their failure to allocate fees collected from the use of folklore or from damages to traditional
communities).
3. Unfair competition laws
Since they prohibit deceptive practices in marketing, unfair
competition laws may be relevant to the protection of folklore to the
extent that such laws challenge the sale of fake copies of works of
folklore.  Although unfair competition laws exist in Africa,475 of far
greater importance for the protection of African folklore abroad are
the laws of developed nations where copies of African folklore often
are mass-produced and passed off as authentic African products.  In
the United States, for example, the relevant laws would include the
Lanham Act’s prohibition on the use of goods with false designations
of origin, or with false descriptions or representations,476 the Federal
Trade Commission Act’s definition of unfair and deceptive practices
affecting commerce to be unlawful,477 and the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act’s provision of injunctive relief and award of
costs478 against deceptive trade practices.479
However, protecting folklore under those laws may not be feasible
due to the generally narrow scope of the prohibited acts.480  For
example, while a misrepresented work of folklore would seem to fall
                                                 
475. For example, in Kenya the relevant laws are the Trade Descriptions Act of 1979, 15
Laws of Kenya, ch. 505 (1980), and the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price
Control Act of 1989, 15 Laws of Kenya (rev. ed. 1990).
The Trade Descriptions Act prohibits the misdescription of goods and services as an unfair
trade practice.  Under the Act, a “trade description” includes
any indication, direct or indirect . . . of any of the following goods:  (a) identity,
quantity, size or gauge; (b) method of manufacture, production, processing or
reconditioning; (c) composition; (d) fitness, purpose, strength, behavior or accuracy;
(e) any physical characteristics not included in the preceding paragraphs; (f) testing
by any person and results thereof; (g) approval by any person or conformity with a
type approved by any person; (h) place or date of manufacture, production,
processing or reconditioning; (i) person by whom manufactured, produced, processed
or reconditioned; (j) other history including previous ownership or use. . . .
Trade Descriptions Act of 1979, supra § 8(1).  For a general discussion of some African unfair
competition laws, see LAW LIBRARY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
COUNTERFEIT (COPYCAT) GOODS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAWS OF SELECTED
FOREIGN NATIONS (1996).
476. See 15 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1994) (prohibiting the use of misleading information
regarding the origin of goods or services).
477. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994) (empowering the
Commission to prevent unfair methods of competition).
478. These remedies are in addition to those that would be available under the common law
or laws of particular states for the same conduct.  See UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2,
7A U.L.A. 281, 304-05 (1999).
479. The Act states:
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when . . . he:  1) passes off goods or
services as those of another, or 2) causes likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or
services . . . .
Id. § 2, 7A U.L.A. at 285.
480. See supra notes 477-79 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the U.S. laws
related to unfair competition).
within the category of prohibited practices in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the definition of unlawfulness in the Act leaves
much to be desired.481  More fundamentally, because unfair
competition laws are concerned with misrepresentations relating to
commercial goods or services,482 they may not be useful in the
protection of some types of folklore not meeting this criterion, such
as ritual and dance.
4. Trade secrets
Trade secrets law has been recommended for protecting folklore
“that has special spiritual significance and has been revealed only to
properly initiated clan members.”483  To constitute misappropriation
of trade secrets in this context, it must be shown that the particular
piece of folklore is a trade secret484 and that the exploiter knew or had
reason to know it was transferred improperly.485  Although it may not
be difficult to demonstrate the secret nature of certain types of
folklore, the necessary state of mind of the exploiter may be difficult
to establish where the items of folklore are sold openly.486
5. Contract law
Contractual arrangements are suggested for the protection of
                                                 
481. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, an unfair act or practice is defined as one
that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.”  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  As applied
to works of folklore, the interests of the authentic owners of the folkloric works—foreigners
making claims not supportable under general intellectual property laws of the United States—
would likely be given short shrift when compared to the average American consumer’s interest
in the rare products.
482. See UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2, 7A U.L.A. at 285-88 (describing
activities relating to “goods and services” that are prohibited as deceptive trade practices).
483. Farley, supra note 181, at 53 (finding that trade secret law could protect folklore as it
protects collective rights).
484. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990).
485. See id. § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. at 438 (finding misappropriations to mean “acquisition of a
trade secret of another person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means”).
486. See Farley, supra note 181, at 53-54 (arguing that trade secret law may not be a viable
option for protecting folklore because the exploiters are often not aware of the folklore’s
sacred nature and thus do not have the necessary intent).
folklore because of the distinct advantages they provide.487  For
example, unlike intellectual property rights, contractual rights can
vest in a group, and be of extended duration.  It is therefore not
surprising to find an increase in the use of contracts to regulate the
use of aspects of traditional knowledge.  For example, the National
Cancer Institute (“NCI”) in the United States has developed a
standard form which it uses as the basis for its agreements with
African organizations participating in its plant collection programs.488
Under those agreements, the NCI typically undertakes to “ensure that
royalties and other forms of compensation [are] provided to the
[source] country organization and to individuals of that country, as
appropriate, in an amount to be negotiated with NCI in consultation
with the host country organization.”489  Compensation for this
purpose is interpreted broadly to include “training, institution
building and information transfer.”490
The use of commercial contracts to effectuate the transfer of
indigenous knowledge, however, appears to have been applied
mainly to plant varieties and is hardly mentioned in the literature in
connection with other types of folklore.491  A major limitation of the
contractual arrangements is that “local communities in general, and
indigenous peoples in particular, are benefited only if the
government or non-government organization so desires.”492  In
addition, traditional communities balk at the use of these
intermediaries.493  Moreover, the potential for abuse remains even
under the contractual arrangements, prompting the Organization of
African Unity to caution against the open conduct of herbal
medicine research for fear of enabling multinational companies to
develop drugs for later sale to developing nations at prohibitive
prices.494  Accordingly, the use of contracts to regulate the use of
                                                 
487. See Cunningham, supra note 15, at 6-7 (discussing the benefits of contractual
arrangements for the protection of indigenous knowledge while demonstrating the possible
drawbacks of such arrangements).
488. See Cragg et al., supra note 8, at 86-87 (describing the terms of the form contracts
between the NCI and source countries in Africa for the collection of plant samples).  The
organizations that have agreed to the contracts include the Center National de Recherches
Pharmaceutiques in Madagascar, the Institute of Traditional Medicine in Tanzania, the
Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association, and the University of Ghana.  See id. at 90.
489. Id. at 96.
490. Posey, supra note 365, at 239 (citations omitted).
491. See generally SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 62-65, 230 (discussing the use of contractual
arrangements for certain types of indigenous knowledge, such as medicinal plant use, while
neglecting other indigenous knowledge such as folklore).
492. Posey, supra note 365, at 239.
493. See id. (noting that indigenous peoples no longer desire to work with intermediaries).
494. See Joseph Hanlon, When the Scientist Meets the Medicine Man, 279 NATURE 284, 284
(1979) (describing the Organization of African Unity’s recommendations of secrecy in herbal
traditional knowledge does not appear to hold much promise.
6. Human rights
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,495 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,496 as
well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights497
guarantee fundamental rights relating to, inter alia, labor, culture,
privacy, and property.498  To the extent these instruments portray
intellectual property rights as human rights,499 they may be used for
the protection of traditional societies’ cultural property interests.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production500 and for the right to own
collective property and not to be deprived of that property.501  In
addition, the Declaration guarantees the right to just and favorable
remuneration for work502 and mandates equal protection for all
under the law.503  Similarly, both the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights establish the right of self-
determination.504
All these provisions are relevant to the claims of traditional
communities inasmuch as they recognize collective rights, may be
used to require compensation for work relating to traditional
                                                 
medicine research to prevent multinational corporations from receiving patents on new drugs
and re-selling them at a premium).
495. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
496. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 4.
497. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
498. See generally id. at 174-79 (listing the essential civic and political rights to be protected
by the signatories); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
496, at 6-9 (setting forth economic, social, and cultural protections guaranteed by the signatory
states); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 495, at 71-79 (guaranteeing rights
based on considerations such as labor, culture, privacy and property).
499. See Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 143 (discussing the manner in which the
Universal Declaration and the International Covenants can be used to protect discrimination
against traditional peoples’ intellectual property rights).
500. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 495, art. 27(2), at 76 (“Everyone
has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”).
501. See id. art. 17, at 74 (announcing the right to own property alone or in associations with
others and the right not to be deprived of that property).
502. See id. art. 23, at 75.
503. See id. art. 7, at 73 (“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law.”).
504. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 497, art. 1, at 173
(“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 496, art. 1, at 5 (same).
knowledge, and prohibit discriminatory tendencies reflected in the
deliberate failure to protect folklore.505  In addition, provisions on
self-determination could be used by certain minority groups who are
also fighting for political independence to support their right to
control and dispose of their cultural resources, including plants that
may be of commercial interest.506  Nevertheless, the human rights
provisions remain of limited utility in the protection of folklore
because they are directed mainly toward state governments and
establish no clear basis for application to transnational corporations
and individuals engaged in the unauthorized use of folklore.507
7. International measures relating to indigenous peoples
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) are the two
leading international institutions to produce work dealing specifically
with indigenous peoples.508  The ILO’s Convention 169 Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
(“Convention 169”) guarantees the right of indigenous peoples to
decide their own development priorities and to control their own
economic, social and cultural development.509  The Convention
requires states to adopt special measures to safeguard the persons,
institutions, property, culture and environment of indigenous
peoples510 and to respect “the special importance of the cultures and
spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with
their lands or territories . . . which they occupy or otherwise use, and
in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.”511
Because of the importance of collectivity to the transmission, use
and protection of traditional knowledge, the reference to collectivity
in Convention 169 may provide grounds “for indigenous peoples to
argue that national and international intellectual property laws which
                                                 
505. See Posey, supra note 365, at 228-29 (discussing the manner in which human rights can
protect indigenous folklore).
506. Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 143 (describing how the right of self determination
can be used to reinforce the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain control over their natural
wealth).
507. See Posey, supra note 365, at 228.
508. See id. at 229 (describing the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s work
dealing with the discrimination of indigenous peoples); Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 143-
44 (noting that the ILO Convention 169 is the only United Nations Convention discussing
indigenous peoples).
509. See Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 144.
510. See id. at 144.
511. International Labour Organisation, Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, art 13(1), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382,
1387 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
do not respect this collective aspect are not in accordance with the
provisions of Convention 169.”512  It does not appear, however, that
the Convention has, in fact, been used for this purpose.  Indeed, the
Convention was not even mentioned in a report of the UN Secretary
General dealing specifically with intellectual property rights and
indigenous peoples.513
In 1982 ECOSOC created a Working Group on Indigenous
Populations which has since worked toward the preparation of a
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.514  The
most recent draft provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to special measures for
protection, as intellectual property, of their traditional
cultural manifestations, such as literature, designs, visual and
performing art, seeds, genetic resources, medicines and
knowledge of the useful properties of fauna and flora.515
Obviously, the adoption of this provision in the final draft would
assist indigenous people in their demands for legal infrastructure to
enable them to benefit from the exploitation of their folklore.516  For
the time being however, as a draft, it is devoid of any legal
significance.
B. Sui Generis Arrangements and Issues of Politics
The argument for adopting a separate instrument for folklore rests
on the incontrovertible fact that folklore is sui generis; despite
similarities with intellectual property rights, folklore is created,
owned and utilized differently.517  Unlike intellectual property,
folklore is designed not to confer economic benefits to individual
creators, but is intended for common exploitation.518  Consequently,
it does not make sense to try to fit folklore within the rigidities of
                                                 
512. Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 144.
513. See Posey, supra note 365, at 228 (stating that the Secretary General’s Concise Report
on Intellectual Property Rights and Indigenous People did not mention Convention 169).
514. For an account of the activities of the Working Group in relation to the rights of
indigenous peoples, see Gudmundur Alfredsson, International Discussion of the Concerns of
Indigenous Peoples:  The United Nations and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 30 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 255, 255-56 (1989); Andree Lawrey, Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous
Rights Under International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 703, 720-22 (1990).
515. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 8,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1992/28 (1992).
516. See Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 146 (noting that the Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples may provide the mechanism by which traditional people can
benefit from their collective knowledge).
517. See Gastor, supra note 40, at 258 (describing the various aspects of folklore which
differentiate it from ordinary intellectual property).
518. Cf. Harmon, supra note 191, at 259 (discussing the “group characteristics” of folklore
and its lack of individuality).
national intellectual property law.  If the uniqueness of folklore
cannot be successfully accommodated under modern intellectual
property concepts,519 then perhaps, it is expedient to consider new
legal arrangements to give effect to the traditional community’s
fundamental right to protect its interests from undue exploitation.520
Relegating the protection of folklore to the fine distinctions of
modern intellectual property concepts would, perhaps, serve no
purpose other than the imposition of western cultural norms on
traditional communities.521
If developing countries have gradually accepted the wisdom of
enforcing the intellectual property interests of the developed nations
despite significant cost to their economies,522 it is only fair that the
developed nations reciprocate with respect to matters of great
concern to the developing nations.523  On this basis, the developed
nations should undertake to protect folklore even where they do not
derive immediate benefits or suffer any harms.  While new
                                                 
519. See supra notes 177-213 (discussing the difficulties in trying to fit folklore within
traditional intellectual property law).
520. See David J. Stephenson, A Legal Paradigm for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 181 n.1 (discussing the failure of western conceptualizations of
intellectual property laws as applied to the property rights of indigenous peoples).  For
example, Greaves writes:
[W]hat is needed is a new legal instrument—instrument of the Twenty-first Century, that
confers ownership and control of indigenous culture on those who practice it; an
ownership and control that is society-wide rather than individual; that applies to what
is already in the public domain; that, like ownership of property, confers an unending,
monopoly ownership; and which is intended not to ensure progress, but to better
enable indigenous societies to preserve and benefit from what is theirs.
Greaves, supra note 1, at 9.
521. As Greaves poignantly argues:
IPR [intellectual property rights] entails looking for legal vehicles in Western law that
could be used by indigenous societies and their advocates to establish their rights of
cultural ownership.  IPR is not for everyone.  IPR is housed in Western law and in its
system of courts, judges and lawyers.  Advocacy of IPR assumes that indigenous
societies or their advocates will use those Western institutions to secure and defend
their rights.  Many indigenous persons are uncomfortable with that.  Why should an
indigenous society, with its own concepts of property and civility, adopt the
assumptions, rules and institutions of the dominant society in order to claim its rights?
The pursuit of intellectual property rights forces indigenous people to play the
dominant society’s game.  Today many refuse.
Greaves, supra note 1, at 5-6.
522. See Amy R. Edge, Note, Preventing Software Piracy Through Regional Trade Agreements:  The
Mexican Example, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 175, 190 (1994) (illustrating several economic
reasons for developing countries’ lack of incentive to create more strict intellectual property
laws including the cost of creation and enforcement of law and the loss of low cost access to
expensive foreign products); Samantha D. Slotkin, Note, Trademark Piracy in Latin America:  A
Case Study of Reebok International Ltd., 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 671, 674 (1996)
(discussing developing countries’ unwillingness to expand intellectual property protection out
of a need for internal development and fear of multinational monopolies).
523. Cf. Slotkin, supra note 522, at 694 (claiming that the best way to curb trademark piracy
is an international registration program).
arrangements on folklore would mean a departure from some
established intellectual property concepts, at least for African
countries it would not be as radical as feared since they already have
made significant inroads in the protection of folklore.524
In devising global solutions for protecting folklore, however, it is
important to clarify the serious confusion that exists in the literature:
the tendency to frame the debate about the protection of folklore in
terms of the rights of “indigenous peoples” where that term is taken
to refer only to certain minority groups in the Americas and
Australia.525  Under this framework, the claims of traditional
communities in other parts of the world, such as Africa, are dismissed
as unworthy of serious international attention because they are
perceived as the claims of “village peoples” or rural farmers.526  The
following passage from Tom Greaves is illustrative:
A . . . worrisome problem is to recognize that indigenous
societies are not alone among peoples who perceive
themselves under threat.  The so-called “village peoples,” the
rural farmers inhabiting the rural areas of most Third World
countries, are also demanding separate recognition and
international status.  They, too, are under assault, have
cultural knowledge of potential or demonstrated economic
value, and are seeking a voice apart from pronouncements
made by others in the national capital.  Their role at the
UNCED conference in Brazil of June, 1992, is just one
indication of their rising ethnic self-consciousness.  As we
pursue IPR [intellectual property rights] for indigenous
peoples, we should anticipate a demand from organized
villager groups for inclusion, and their demand has
considerable persuasive force.  Yet, widening IPR’s special
privilege to these groups may weaken the IPR prospects for
indigenous societies, who include among their political assets
the fact that they are usually seen by members of the
dominant society as small, beleaguered, and for whom
benefits can be accorded without significantly affecting the
quality of life for members of the dominant society.  When
rural agricultural peoples are included, anxiety will rise that
the dominant society’s life way may be disrupted.527
                                                 
524. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing the regional arrangements in Africa that deal with
intellectual property concerns).
525. See Descola, supra note 258, at 208 (noting that the debate over indigenous intellectual
property rights only discusses indigenous peoples of the Americas and Australia); Greaves, supra
note 1, at 10-11 (discussing the emergence of intellectual property rights in the Americas, while
neglecting to speak of the indigenous peoples of Africa).
526. Cf. Descola, supra note 258, at 208-09.
527. Greaves, supra note 1, at 11-12.
This view is unfortunate.  The author does not articulate a cogent
reason why folkloric rights of the so-called indigenous peoples are
more deserving of international attention than those of groups in
other regions.  Works from other communities such as Africa are
subject to the same unauthorized and exploitative uses as those of the
“indigenous peoples.”  If the author’s fear of enlarging the group
entitled to protection is to avoid scaring the majority in the
developed societies, it is unclear how such fear is automatically
minimized when the demand for protection is made only by
“indigenous peoples” in the developed countries.
This Article submits that a developed country’s government is less
likely to be threatened by the recognition of the folkloric rights of a
tribal group in a foreign country than it would by the recognition of
claims by an “indigenous” group within its nation to control aspects
of culture closely resembling independence from the government.
For this reason, it would be erroneous to attribute the reluctance to
recognize folkloric rights internationally to the inclusion in the
debate of the demands of villager groups in developing countries.
Greaves’ view reflects a failure to recognize that the term
“indigenous peoples,” often artificially differentiates between the
folkloric concerns of those people and traditional communities in
other parts of the world.528  Specifically, it evidences a failure to
understand that while other traditional communities demand greater
protection for folklore, they do not see the issues in terms of a quest
for political power.
What is most revealing about the excerpt from Greaves is the
implicit recognition that political considerations may influence
solutions to the problem of folklore in some parts of the world.  It is
evident that in the Americas and Australia for example, the Indian
and Aboriginal populations, respectively, are minority groups fighting
for political independence.529  Because these indigenous peoples
                                                 
528. According to Descola:
[T]he debate has been mainly restricted up to now to native peoples of the Americas
and Australia, that is, to cultural and linguistic autochthonous minorities that are
clearly identifiable within nations settled by Europeans.  In the course of their
struggles for land, dignity, and the recognition of their cultural uniqueness, these
minorities have often obtained special or derogatory legal statutes (concerning land
tenure, civic duties, or personal rights) which contribute to setting them apart, socially
and spatially, from ordinary citizens and render them more conspicuous as distinct
subsets of the national communities.  But such visibility is not the norm everywhere in
the world, and advocates of “differentialism” should perhaps pay more attention to the
fact that cultural diversity is not only an internal phenomenon typical of great melting-
pot nations but also a feature of the whole wide world.
Descola, supra note 258, at 208-09.
529. See id. (stating that native peoples of the Americas and Australia have been wrongfully
assert their rights to control the use of traditional knowledge while at
the same time demanding greater sovereignty, the debate about the
protection of their folkloric rights tends to be meshed into a broader
political debate.530  It is then assumed, quite erroneously, of course,
that any call for the international protection of folklore, regardless of
the particular community involved, has political connotations.
This is not the case in Africa.  Most Africans belong to tribes and
have roots in traditional communities, whether they live in villages or
cities.  The lowest rural shepherd boy is no more a traditionalist than
is the President of the country living in the state capital.  Also, tribal
groups are as much a part of the national government as any group
could possibly be.  As such, they are not minority groups fighting for
political power.  That central governments in Africa are not
threatened politically may explain why they have readily
acknowledged in legislation the entitlement of traditional groups to
their folklore.531  Consequently political considerations as understood
by Greaves are irrelevant to the debate about protecting folklore in
Africa.
C. Regional Solutions
The disparate treatment of folklore by developed and developing
countries suggests that a regional approach as opposed to a more
encompassing global treaty has a greater chance of success.  To this
end, African countries that already recognize and protect folklore
could be urged to adopt a binding regional arrangement to regulate
the use of folklore outside the region, where the most lucrative uses
of folklore are found.  Complementing the regional arrangement
should be aggressive efforts at the state level to safeguard folklore
through measures involving the identification,532 conservation,533
                                                 
deemed more worthy of international attention because of their many struggles for land and
respect).
530. In the United States, American Indian tribal governments enjoy a measure of
autonomy from the central government which is reflected in their right to pass laws governing
conduct within the Indian reservations.  See Pinel & Evans, supra note 21, at 43-44 (“Native
American tribes are using the principle of tribal sovereignty to define and control the use of
culturally based knowledge to exercise their intellectual property rights.”).  Perhaps, it is more
politically expedient for them to assert greater control of native cultural knowledge on the basis
of this limited sovereignty than to depend on the benevolent acts of the central government
which could be perceived as weakening their political independence.
531. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
532. To facilitate the identification of folklore, it will be necessary to create a register of
institutions concerned with folklore and set up identification and recording systems for the
collection, transcription, and cataloguing of folklore.  See REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE,
supra note 28, reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 39, 45 (1985) (recommending
identification procedures in order to protect folklore).
533. Measures for conserving culture include establishing networks of archives to store
preservation,534 and dissemination535 of folklore.
It will be necessary to create a special agency to coordinate
protection measures in the region.  This Article proposes that the
agency be composed of representatives of national agencies
concerned with the protection of folklore.  An entirely new group of
persons devoted exclusively to protecting works of folklore is
preferred over OAPI and ESARIPO not only because the staff of
those organizations may already be over-extended, but to underscore
the distinctiveness of folklore from intellectual property law.
The regional arrangement should require national implementing
legislation to enable the enforcement in national courts of rights
recognized in the regional treaty.  To this effect, a provision
obligating contracting states to protect expressions of folklore
originating in other contracting states would be desirable.  As much
as possible, the regulation of the use of folklore within each country
should continue to be left to the respective national agencies.
Therefore, the regional agency need not be concerned with the
specifics of authorizing the use of folklore within the boundaries of
member states.
However, the regional agency would play a critical role in the
exploitation of African folklore abroad where, without the benefit of
a complementing international treaty, protection of folklore
continues to be weak.  The proposed agency would play the role of a
focused and specialized channel for articulating, asserting, and
defending rights to African folklore.  Another role for the agency
would be to act as the conduit for processing requests to use folklore
received from interested parties abroad, which would then be
channeled to the relevant state or states.  Assigning responsibility for
these matters to the regional agency would be far more effective than
leaving them to the national agencies whose scattered efforts cannot
provide the same unified front that a regional agency can provide.
A prime objective of the regional agency would be to work with
                                                 
information and documents; creating museums to exhibit folklore; establishing an index of all
institutions and persons holding items of folklore and training collectors, archivists,
documentalists and other specialists in the conservation of folklore.  See id., reprinted in 19
COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 45.
534. To preserve folklore from the detrimental effects of foreign cultures, it may be
necessary to recommend the study of folklore in educational institutions, guarantee the right of
the various ethnic groups and national communities to their own folklore and set up
appropriate organizations such as Arts Councils, which would be open to various interest
groups.  See generally id., reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2), at 41-45.
535. Dissemination is enhanced by organizing national folklore events such as fairs, festivals,
films and exhibitions as well as publishing and facilitating meetings and exchanges between
individuals, groups and institutions concerned with folklore.  See id., reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT
BULL. (No. 2), at 41-45.
governments of developed nations to devise a method for
recognizing rights in African folklore.536  The aim here should not
necessarily be to get those governments to pass new legislation
providing for rights to folklore under domestic legislation.  Rather,
the governments should be urged to facilitate the enforcement of
claims to folklore by agreeing to accept that appropriate
determinations by the regional agency (or relevant national agencies)
create very strong presumptions of the existence of folkloric rights
for purposes of litigation in the developed nations.  Such an
arrangement would obviate the need to test the asserted claims of
folklore under the strict intellectual property criteria of the
developed nations.
According some deference to the claims of traditional community
leaders in the manner suggested would not be unusual as U.S. courts
have regularly deferred to the decisions of foreign institutions on
matters such as the validity of customary law marriages.537  In addition,
recent U.S. legislation authorizing the return by museums of sacred
objects taken from the graves of American Indians538 demonstrates
the U.S. government’s receptivity to credible assertions by indigenous
people of rights to their cultural property.539  Indeed, following the
government’s lead, some private museums have adopted even more
liberal policies regarding the return of illegally acquired Native
American property.540
                                                 
536. The regional agency might want to look at the proposal in Australia regarding
ownership of Aboriginal folklore for potential methods of dealing with African folklore.  See
infra notes 549-52 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between the “customary
user” and the “traditional owner” of folklore as a means of resolving the tension between the
concepts of ownership in modern intellectual property laws and those in traditional societies).
537. For example, in Francisco Vanguardia Batiller v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
1996 WL 384872, at *1 (9th. Cir. July 9, 1996) (unpublished disposition), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in denying a request for continuance of a hearing to allow additional
research on a document admitted to prove a marriage in the Philippines, held that with regards
to documents relating to foreign marriages, “the Court does not normally go behind the . . .
validity of such documents.”  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals gave “great weight to that
official record of the Philippines in the absence of countervailing evidence.”
538. See generally The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994) (addressing ownership or control over Native American cultural
items).
539. Under the statute, persons who request repatriation of human remains and ritual
objects, must substantiate direct descent, or in the case of objects, prior ownership.  See id. §
3005(a)(5).
540. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 13, at 194 (suggesting that “[the legislation] establishes a
legal framework for repatriating human remains and ritual objects to Indian tribes that request
them . . .  The implementation of this legislation . . . has now become a routine part of museum
practice.”).  One example is the National Museum of the American Indian of the Smithsonian
Institution.  See Lobo, supra note 20, at 44-45.  The Smithsonian’s policy establishes broad
parameters of cultural materials that will be considered for repatriation, including “communally
owned Native American property, objects acquired illegally, and ceremonial and religious
objects ‘needed by Native American religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act’s
requirement of proof of prior ownership as a condition for the
repatriation of cultural objects is a much easier burden than is
required to show entitlement to intellectual property rights.541  One
effect of this legislation has been to unleash a huge wave of demands
by Indian tribes to museums for the return of cultural property which
has varied from “notes, drawings, [and] photographs dealing with
religious matters”542 in the case of the Hopi tribe, to “all images, text,
ceremonies, music, songs, stories, symbols, beliefs, customs, ideas and
other spiritual objects and concepts” in the case of the Apache
tribe.543  These developments coincided with the well-publicized
success of the representatives of the Coroma people in Bolivia who
came to San Francisco to demand the repatriation of sacred
communal property stolen from them in the late 1970s.544
Thus, the climate is favorable for the consideration of special
arrangements regarding the recognition and enforcement of African
folklore in the United States.  Replacing the need to show
entitlement under general intellectual property law with the relatively
light burden of tracing ownership as allowed under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act would go a long
way to enhance the protection of African culture.  Such an
arrangement would be especially important with respect to items
illegally taken out of the African continent or religious artifacts whose
use as decorative art is offensive to traditional norms.  The
experience of the United States with the Asian countries prior to the
adoption of the present GATT provision on intellectual property
demonstrates the feasibility of governments working out special
arrangements to protect the intellectual property rights of their
citizens.545  There is no reason why the same cannot be achieved with
                                                 
American religions.’”  Id. at 44.  In addition, the policy is to be carried out in accordance with
applicable treaties and international agreements and the Museum agrees to abide by the
principles of the UNESCO Convention and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in its
acquisition policies.  See id. at 45.
541. As we have seen, U.S. intellectual property law requires proof that the work is original
and fixed in a tangible medium to obtain copyrights; that the object is novel, useful, and non-
obvious for patents; and that the product is distinctive in the case of trademarks.  See supra notes
387-98 and accompanying text (discussing statutes pertaining to copyright, patent, and
trademark regulations).
542. See Brown, supra note 13, at 194 (quoting a letter written by Hopi Tribe Chairman and
CEO Vernon Maseyesvo to several museums about Hopi interests in field data regarding the
tribe).
543. See id.
544. See id. (referring to “similar manifestos” from other tribes in South America and other
parts of the world).
545. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing how the United States pressured
developing countries to adopt and enforce strong intellectual property rights).
respect to the protection of African folklore.
To be able to discharge its responsibilities effectively, the proposed
regional agency should, with the help of the national representatives,
compile a compendium of works of African folklore indicating where
particular types of protected works are found and any restrictions that
may exist regarding their commercial exploitation.  Providing such
information to public libraries and interested parties in the United
States would go a long way toward reducing cases of unauthorized use
that stem from simple ignorance about the protected nature of the
works or the identity of their owners.  This information would also
simplify the process of obtaining prior authorization for use of
protected works.
Some of the problems noted earlier in connection with national
intellectual property legislation546 could be addressed under a
regional arrangement.  For example, regarding the issue of rights of
folklore originating in different states, a provision could be added
authorizing representatives of the affected countries to agree on an
equitable method of splitting the fees collected.  If this proves
unworkable, the matter could be settled through arbitration or
through a dispute settlement mechanism established under the
auspices of the regional agency.
Contracting states should be required to ensure that proceeds for
the use of works of folklore—whether collected by the national
agency for uses of folklore within the nation, or forwarded to the
states by the regional agency for uses abroad—are allocated to
traditional communities and not to state institutions or societies of
authors.  This calls for a satisfactory resolution of the extremely
difficult questions of defining the size of those communities547 and
identifying the proper representatives548 to receive the funds.  In view
of the complex and varied practices involved, however, it may not be
feasible to state clear and uniform rules of ownership, or entitlement
to compensation for the use of folklore in traditional communities.
This matter should therefore be left to the states.  However,
guidelines on the subject must be required from the national
agencies.  At the very minimum, these guidelines should be capable
of identifying clan or tribal leaders to receive payments on behalf of
                                                 
546. See supra notes 177-213 and accompanying text (identifying problems in using general
intellectual property laws to protect folklore).
547. For a description of the ambiguity in defining membership in and boundaries between
indigenous groups, see Brush, supra note 12, at 136.
548. See Donald Tuzin, Michael F. Brown’s Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 217, 217 (1998) (commentary) (addressing the dilemmas of selecting
individuals to represent exploited cultural groups).
other community members in accordance with custom.
In this regard, it may be instructive to consider the proposal in
Australia549 to draw a distinction between the customary user550 and
the traditional owner,551 of Aboriginal folklore as a way of tackling the
tensions between the concepts of ownership inherent in modern
intellectual property laws and traditional rights.  Under the
Australian scheme, a traditional owner would not necessarily be a
customary user, and vice versa.  Thus members of a traditional
community could exercise general rights to folklore, while not
necessarily being treated as the owners thereof.  This approach is
attractive because it would permit a more readily identifiable and
limited group of persons to exercise certain rights of ownership in
the more conventional sense; such as authorizing and receiving
compensation for the use of folklore.552
With regard to compensation, this Article recommends that it
should not be restricted solely to the payment of fees determined in
advance, but could, depending on the type of folklore, be broadened
to incorporate more innovative arrangements involving in-kind, up-
front payments and future sourcing,553 royalties554 and profits555 to
                                                 
549. In view of its significance as an integral part of Australian culture, serious thought has
always been given to the protection of Aboriginal folklore; particularly from unauthorized uses
which either violate the secret-sacred nature of folklore or prevent adequate compensation to
the Aborigines.  In 1981, the Working Party looking into the matter came out with a number of
recommendations, including the creation of a Commissioner for Aboriginal Folklore and an
assisting Advisory Folklore Board.  See Robin A.I. Bell, Protection of Folklore:  The Australian
Experience, 19 COPYRIGHT BULL. (No. 2) 4, 12-13 (1985).  Under the proposals, any destruction,
mutilation, or export of items of folklore that resulted in permanent loss to the Aborigines of
their cultural property would result in stiff criminal penalties.  See Weiner, supra note 327, at 83.
This is important for protecting secret-sacred works as their use has often been restricted by
custom.  Outside of a recommended clearance procedure when doubt exists as to the secret-
sacredness of an object, the proposed scheme does not require prior approval regarding the
use of folklore.  See id. at 82.  Significantly, the proposals specify no time limits for the rights in
folklore, therefore, the protection of folklore would continue for an unlimited duration.
Despite various beneficial and innovative features, however, the Working Party’s proposals have
yet to be incorporated into law.  Instead, the protection of folklore in Australia continues to be
based on general intellectual property laws, trade laws, and recent radical judicial activism.  For
a discussion of recent cases involving the protection of aboriginal art such as the Milpurrurru,
Yumbulul, Bulun and Mabo cases, see generally Golvan, supra note 180, at 227 (recounting the
story of Aboriginal painter John Bulun Bulun).
550. The proposals defined a customary user as “any Aboriginal person or group living
subject to Aboriginal custom and entitled by that custom to create works derived from the item
of Aboriginal folklore in question.”  See Weiner, supra note 327, at 81.
551. The Working Party’s report defined a traditional owner as “the traditional or
customary Aboriginal owner of the item or another Aborigine or group of Aborigines in whom
the custody or protection of the item is entrusted by and in accordance with Aboriginal custom
or tradition.”  See id.
552. Under the proposals, it is the responsibility of the traditional owner or user to inform
the Commissioner for Aboriginal Folklore about the arrangements concerning commercial uses
of folklore.  The Commissioner would then negotiate an acceptable fee with the user which is
then distributed equitably to the traditional owners.  See id. at 82.
553. For example, an international team of researchers in South-East Nigeria seeking to
benefit communities corresponding to the different stages involved
in collecting and exploiting folklore.556  To avoid placing all the
initiative for this in the hands of the national agencies, the active
participation of the local groups, when identified, would have to be
sought.
                                                 
collect and experiment on plants and traditional medicines for possible use in the treatment of
diseases, devised the following approach:
Five percent of project funds ($25,000) would be set aside for in-kind, up-front
support to the villages and towns in which the team directly worked.  This would
ma[k]e sure each community received a concrete, immediate benefit from working
with the team, since it was unlikely that a commercially valuable drug would result
from the team’s research.  If a plant medicine were promising and more plants were
needed, the team would buy all future plant supplies from the communities which
originally gave the plant, creating another source of income for the communities.
If a commercial drug were discovered and developed, the team also would require
the drug manufacturer to purchase future plant supplies from the project region, so
long as consistent and sufficient plant supplies were provided.  If a plant was
endangered, or not enough were available, the team agreed to work with communities
to solve these problems by farming the plant, changes in harvesting techniques, or by
addressing any broader causes, such as deforestation, which caused the shortage.
McGowan & Udeinya, supra note 14, at 64.
554. Continuing their report, the team of researchers also noted:
Royalties could be earned in several ways.  The size of the royalty would depend on
what the team sold to a drug company and the success of the drug sales.  If the team
simply sold a dried plant sample to a drug company, it could expect to receive the
standard royalty share of 1 to 2% of the sales of any commercial drug developed from
this sample.  If the team sold an extract from a plant, the expected royalty would be
larger, potentially 3 to 5% of sales.  If the team sold a chemical compound and the
compound were promising, the team could get a greater royalty, ranging from 5 to
15%.  The amount would depend on how much testing the team had done and what
disease the drug was for—a cure for AIDS would be worth more than one for athlete’s
foot.
Of this 25% royalty share for local communities, half would go to the Local
Government area from which the plant was collected and half would go to the village
or town where the plant was collected.  This 50-50 split between the Local
Governments and the villages was a compromise between two goals—to reward
individual, local innovation and collective, traditional knowledge—and all the
different suggestions about who to pay.  We decided this after a long, circular debate
over who should receive royalties—individuals, families, villages, Local Governments,
the entire project area, local non-profits and so on.  Unfortunately we made good,
logical arguments in support of every position.
Id.
555. The report further noted:
The team also dedicated 5% of all commercial drug profits (if a drug were created) to
projects in southeastern Nigeria which promoted rural health, traditional medicines,
biodiversity conservation and sustainable economic development.  This 5%
requirement meant any drug company that sold the drug had to agree to turn over 5%
of its profits to benefit the project area.  This 5% requirement would be part of the
licensing contract between the team and the drug company.  The drug company also
had to make the drug available, at cost, to all Nigerians afflicted with the disease
helped by the drug.  This guaranteed that all Nigerians benefited from the biodiversity
and community knowledge in their country.
Id. at 65.
556. See generally King, supra note 7, at 71 (suggesting that the question is not whether
indigenous people should benefit from their knowledge but how to provide these benefits most
fairly and effectively).
Through regular meetings with the national agencies, local groups
could be encouraged to articulate their concerns, and devise suitable
compensation arrangements.  This is important because without also
transforming the traditional communities into effective pressure
groups through financial or other support, they may not enjoy the
full benefits of their rights in folklore.557  To avoid all doubt, this
discussion regarding compensation should not be taken as urging
indirectly the participation by traditional communities in market
economics.558  It is up to them to decide whether to commercialize
folklore.  The concern of this Article is to ensure that if they decide
to do so, adequate compensation schemes are in place.
CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed significant problems with protecting
folklore under modern intellectual property laws.  Despite similarities
with intellectual property, folklore has been shown to be sui generis.  It
is created in a gradual fashion for use by traditional communities
which eventually own it.  Unlike modern intellectual property,
folklore does not confer short-term rights to individuals.  Instead, it
recognizes group rights which can exist in perpetuity.  Accordingly,
this Article has endorsed the adoption of separate legal arrangements
to accommodate the uniqueness of folklore.
Although the adoption of a binding international instrument
would markedly improve the global protection of folklore, this Article
has noted the reluctance among developed nations to join in such an
effort.  At the same time, however, the Article has discerned much
enthusiasm among the African nations for specific legal provisions
regarding folklore.  Given the present circumstances, the Article
therefore recommends a regional solution rather than an
international one.  To ensure vigorous and uniform protection of
folklore outside the African region, such as in the United States, this
Article recommends the creation of a regional agency with authority
to institute infringement actions abroad and to serve as the conduit
for processing requests to use folklore as well as distributing
compensation collected for the use of folklore.
Hopefully, the lessons learned from a successful implementation of
                                                 
557. See Yamin & Posey, supra note 178, at 143 (noting the practical problem of the lack of
indigenous peoples’ financial and technical means by which they could be able to benefit from
their intellectual property rights).
558. See Posey, supra note 271, at 97 (arguing that native peoples should be justly
compensated for their “knowledge” through guarantees of intellectual property rights, however,
this is not to say that native peoples should involve themselves in “market economics”).
the proposed regional arrangement in Africa will encourage other
members of the international community, who have thus far had a
lukewarm attitude toward the protection of folklore, to take the issue
more seriously and to join in efforts to adopt a binding international
arrangement on the protection of folklore.
